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IAC-D-23/1

Progress Report on [REDACTED]
Program, January 1951 - January 1956
(14 August 1956)

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IAC-D-29/4	Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities (13 Sept 1951)
IAC-D-29/5	Recommended Plan to Accomplish the Summary Evaluation Required by Paragraph 2 of NSC Action 543 (1 October 1951)
IAC-D-29/6	Revision of Annex 6 to NSC 114/2 (22 March 1952)
IAC-D-29/7	Revision of Annex 6 to NSC 114/2 (27 March 1952)
IAC-D-29/8	Revision of Annex 6 to NSC 114/2 (9 April 1952)
IAC-D-29/9	Revision of Annex 6 to NSC 114/2 (15 April 1952)

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Job no. 85S00362R is one of several DCI jobs recommended by the DCI History Staff for the Historical Review Program in November 1990. These documents had been reviewed in 1986 by the Historical Review Section, found generally unproductive, and the effort was abandoned. With this in mind we decided to do a quick review of the eight boxes with no reproduction and no actual sanitizing--just yellow, white or green bands. Although we found some historically useful and releasable material the results pretty much confirmed our earlier judgment:

Box 1 (Gloria):	DIF
" 2 (Gloria):	40% releasable
" 3 (Frank) :	33% "
" 4 (Jim) :	38% "
" 5 (Jim) :	05% "
" 6 (Frank) :	50% "
" 7 (Jim) :	14% "
" 8 (Jim) :	DIF
average:	22.5% releasable

If and when this job is taken up again, a full, detailed by the normal procedures would be necessary for boxes 2 to 7.

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

REVISION OF ANNEX NO. 6 TO NSC 114/2

For the information of the IAC there is attached hereto the final version of the redraft of Annex No. 6 to NSC 114/2 as approved by the IAC at its meeting on 14 April 1952. This paper has been transmitted to the NSC.

James Q. Reber
Secretary

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Class. Changed to:	TS G C
Next Review Date:
Auth:	HR 70-3
Date:	10-21-91
By:	233768

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IAC-D-29/9
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Draft Annex No. 6FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

Foreign Intelligence

1. Insofar as possible the intelligence programs of the intelligence agencies and CIA are tied into the President's over-all program for Fiscal Year 1953, although in many cases indirectly. It should be noted, however, that many of the functions and programs of intelligence must be of a continuing nature quite apart from the specific aspects of any given over-all annual program. Thus the departmental intelligence agencies and CIA, which compose the Federal Intelligence Community, must make certain that the substantive objectives controlling their collection, research, and estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and to others which confront the National Security Council. These activities must be so developed and related that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives. Many intelligence programs have an intimate bearing on one another or are a composite of departmental programs and activities so that the strengthening of our habits and means of collaboration is in a sense a major part of the intelligence program.

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2. As a matter of convenience and means of giving an appraisal of the extent to which intelligence programs may achieve their goals for Fiscal Year 1953 within the resources available the following are analyzed below separately:

- a. National Intelligence Estimates;
- b. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates and intelligence programs for departmental needs;
- c. Current intelligence; and
- d. The collection of intelligence information.

3. National Intelligence Estimates: These Estimates, under the arrangements developed since October 1950, are today the authoritative intelligence opinion of the Government. Through the support of the programs for research and collection discussed below, and with the existing resources employed directly in the estimating program, it is expected that continued improvement in the quality of our National Intelligence Estimates can be expected during the period under discussion.

4. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates: The achievement of the standard of research in support of National Intelligence Estimates, which is our goal, must be viewed in terms of years rather than a limited period such as FY 1953. This achievement is dependent on a sharper definition of the essential research

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required, on new methods of cooperative effort, and in certain cases on increases in staff.

a. Political intelligence research: The political intelligence programs of the Department of State are oriented towards the urgent problems confronting the NSC and the policy makers in the Department, towards research-in-depth into the situations out of which the immediate problems arise, and towards new demands for specialized intelligence products, notably in the psychological warfare field. Adjustments have been made, and will continue to be made, in organization and in priorities with a view to meeting these objectives. However, it remains true that the intelligence production resources of the Department are insufficient to meet urgent and specialized needs and at the same time to maintain the research effort essential in the longer term if intelligence efforts directed at immediate problems are to have a sound basis.

b. Military intelligence as a result of Korea and the threat of hot war is faced with increased demands of an operational nature. At the same time it is faced with responsibilities in support of National Intelligence Estimates. The Military Services will also bear the brunt of the increasing demands of NATO and its commands for tactical and strategic

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intelligence. Despite efforts to rationalize intelligence research activities to meet these demands, the resources presently allocated to these activities will not permit such demands to be met as they should.

c. Economic intelligence: It is expected that the coordinated program which has been launched for the systematic analysis of Soviet and satellite economies will have made considerable progress during this period. It should provide a better, though by no means complete, appraisal of the long-range capabilities of the USSR and should suggest possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing economic vulnerabilities. By the end of FY 1953 the cooperative research in this area under the guidance of the Economic Intelligence Committee should have made satisfactory progress toward defining the major problems, identifying the available and relevant information existing in the Government, developing new methods of research and producing a substantial number of studies which will provide a firm foundation for National Intelligence Estimates and reliable departure points for continuous survey and appraisal of Soviet economic activity. The needs of intelligence support for economic warfare have not yet been clearly defined though it is believed they will be of a magnitude beyond the existing resources of the intelligence community.

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d. Scientific and technical intelligence, to a certain extent like economic intelligence, is a responsibility of the agencies in respect of their individual needs. The intelligence community is seeking to define clearly the areas of responsibility in this field and will develop mutually satisfactory arrangements for pooling of resources requiring joint effort. This planned cooperative attack on vital scientific and technological intelligence problems should result by the end of FY 1953 in considerable improvement. Notable success in these respects has already been achieved in the coordination of atomic energy intelligence.

e. National Intelligence Survey: The production schedule for NIS has been revised during the last year to take into account changed world conditions. It is expected that the goals established for the coming year will be substantially met with the existing resources available for this program. This year's program will be the equivalent of eight complete country national intelligence studies. This will leave approximately 60% of the high priority areas to be completed.

5. Current intelligence programs are of course related to both operational and strategic needs of the departments and the President and are keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to

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provide warning of imminent attack by hostile powers and of situations abroad affecting U. S. security. For purposes of this warning the collaborative efforts of the current intelligence resources of the departments and CIA are brought together through the IAC Watch Committee. It is expected that by the end of FY 1953 the individual and cooperative efforts should be more sensitive in the detection of hostile threats as well as current trends which necessarily have a bearing upon National Estimates and policy matters.

6. Collection: The guidance for those resources devoted to collection activities both overt and covert should be materially improved by virtue of the foregoing programs although the nature of the Soviet society will greatly limit our achievement. Programs are being designed to exploit more effectively existing U. S. governmental and other available sources of overt foreign intelligence information which have hitherto gone unexploited. Although by far the greatest quantity of intelligence information can be collected by overt means, much of the most critical information needed can be obtained, if at all, only by clandestine means. The objective here, because of the difficulty of the target, namely, the Soviet orbit, must be to define clearly the most important targets. United States efforts in clandestine operations are relatively new and the number of personnel trained and qualified as is necessary for successful

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operation is small. Clandestine intelligence, therefore, must be viewed in the long perspective of 15 to 20 years and our objectives for the Fiscal Year 1953 call for the elimination of marginal targets and greater concentration on the significant targets, the building up of operational bases and nets which inevitably require a great deal of time and are frequently faced with setbacks arising from counterespionage activities of the enemy or detection and exposure of our effort. It is recognized, of course, that the military services have urgent tactical intelligence requirements which also require the use of clandestine collection activities. By the end of this period considerable strides will have been made toward isolating the most essential elements of information which must be collected by covert means giving proper attention to priorities. There has been some success in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and satellites by clandestine technological and scientific means. The achievement of greater success in this field is to a great extent dependent on the establishment of arrangements for cooperative concentration of efforts.

7. With respect to the foregoing discussion of U. S. intelligence programs, it should be noted that our intelligence system is confronted by certain limitations which will inevitably result in a margin of uncertainty both in our estimate and in our ability to

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give early warning of attack. These limitations arise from the security consciousness and practices of the Soviet State; the high state of war preparations of the Soviet; their flexibility in making decisions and the speed with which, under their system, such decisions can be implemented. It should be emphasized that the best collective effort of which the United States intelligence community -- or any other -- is capable cannot guarantee adequate advance warning of a surprise attack.

Related Activities

8. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned in support of the President's programs will require increasing financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large. However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers for this work. Personnel needs will require increased reliance on Armed Service personnel.

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SUGGESTED CHANGES IN ANNEX 6 (IAC-D-29/8)

Revise paragraph 5, first sentence, as follows:

Current intelligence programs are of course related to both operational and strategic needs of the departments and the President and are keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to provide warning of imminent attack by hostile powers of and situations abroad affecting U. S. security.

Paragraph 6, second sentence to read:


Programs are being designed to exploit more effectively [certain] existing U. S. governmental and other available sources of overt foreign intelligence information which have hitherto gone unexploited.

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<p style="text-align: center;">TOP SECRET</p> <p>MEMORANDUM FOR: ^{Security Information} <u>GENERAL SMITH</u></p> <p>NSC 114/2, US Programs for National Security, is currently under revision.</p> <p>The attached draft Annex 6 to NSC 114/2, prepared at the request of the NSC to fulfill the intelligence aspect of the revision, has been prepared along the lines suggested by the NSC Secretariat and in consultation with interested CIA offices and representatives of the IAC.</p> <p><u>RECOMMENDATION:</u> Approval of attached draft for transmittal to NSC.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"> LEB</p> <p style="text-align: right;">11 April 1952 <u>(DATE)</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">TOP SECRET Security Information</p>

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9 April 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

REVISION OF ANNEX 6 TO NSC 114/2

1. Attached for consideration of the IAC is a revision of Annex 6, dealing with foreign intelligence and related activities, which has been prepared for inclusion in the NSC 114/2 revision.

2. The present draft has been prepared through the cooperation of the IAC agencies.

James Q. Reber
Secretary

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Noted by D/DCI [Signature]
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Date:	10-21-91
By:	233768

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Draft Annex No. 6

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

1. Insofar as possible the intelligence programs of the intelligence agencies and CIA are tied into the President's over-all program for Fiscal Year 1953, although in many cases indirectly. It should be noted, however, that many of the functions and programs of intelligence must be of a continuing nature quite apart from the specific aspects of any given over-all annual program. Thus the departmental intelligence agencies and CIA, which compose the Federal Intelligence community, must make certain that the substantive objectives controlling their collection, research, and estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and to others which confront the National Security Council. These activities must be so developed and related that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives. Many intelligence programs have an intimate bearing on one another or are a composite of departmental programs and activities so that the strengthening of our habits and means of collaboration is in a sense a major part of the intelligence program.

2. As a matter of convenience and means of giving an appraisal of the extent to which intelligence programs may achieve their goals for Fiscal Year 1953 within the resources available the following are analyzed

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- b. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates and intelligence programs for departmental needs;
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3. National Intelligence Estimates: These Estimates, under the arrangements developed since October 1950, are today the authoritative intelligence opinion of the Government. Through the support of the programs for research and collection discussed below, and with the existing resources employed directly in the estimating program, it is expected that continued improvement in the quality of our National Intelligence Estimates can be expected during the period under discussion.

4. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates: The achievement of the standard of research in support of National Intelligence Estimates, which is our goal, must be viewed in terms of years rather than a limited period such as FY 1953. This achievement is dependent on a sharper definition of the essential research required, on new methods of cooperative effort, and in certain cases on increases in staff.

a. Political intelligence research: The political intelligence programs of the Department of State are oriented towards the urgent problems confronting the NSC and the policy makers in the Department towards research-in-depth into the situations out of which the immediate problems

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arise, and towards new demands for specialized intelligence products, notably in the psychological warfare field. Adjustments have been made, and will continue to be made, in organization and in priorities with a view to meeting these objectives. However, it remains true that the intelligence production resources of the Department -- which are now less than at the outbreak of the Korean war -- are insufficient to meet urgent and specialized needs and at the same time to maintain the research effort essential in the longer term if intelligence efforts directed at immediate problems are to have a sound basis.

b. Military intelligence as a result of Korea and the threat of hot war is faced with increased demands of an operational nature. At the same time it is faced with responsibilities in support of National Intelligence Estimates. The Military Services will also bear the brunt of the increasing demands of NATO and its commands for tactical and strategic intelligence. Despite efforts to rationalize intelligence research activities to meet these demands, the resources presently allocated to these activities will not permit such demands to be met as they should.

c. Economic Intelligence: It is expected that the coordinated program which has been launched for the systematic analysis of Soviet and satellite economies will have made considerable progress during this period. It should provide a better, though by no means complete, appraisal of the long-range capabilities of the USSR and should suggest

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possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing economic vulnerabilities. By the end of FY 1953 the cooperative research in this area under the guidance of the Economic Intelligence Committee should have made satisfactory progress toward defining the major problems, identifying the available and relevant information existing in the Government, developing new methods of research and producing a substantial number of studies which will provide a firm foundation for National Intelligence Estimates and reliable departure points for continuous survey and appraisal of Soviet economic activity. The needs of intelligence support for economic warfare have not yet been clearly defined though it is believed they will be of a magnitude beyond the existing resources of the intelligence community.

d. Scientific and technical intelligence, to a certain extent like economic intelligence, is a responsibility of the agencies in respect of their individual needs. To date the intelligence community has not clearly defined the areas of responsibility in this field nor have they developed mutually satisfactory arrangements for pooling of resources on problems requiring joint effort. By the end of FY 1953 it is expected that such arrangements will be worked out and that a cooperative attack on vital scientific and technological intelligence problems will have resulted in considerable improvement. Notable success in these respects has already been achieved in the coordination of atomic energy intelligence.

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c. National Intelligence Survey: The production schedule for NIS has been revised during the last year to take into account changed world conditions. It is expected that the goals established for the coming year will be substantially met with the existing resources available for this program. This year's program will be the equivalent of eight complete country national intelligence studies. This will leave approximately 60% of the high priority areas to be completed.

5. Current intelligence programs are of course related to both operational and strategic needs of the departments and the President and are keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to provide warning of imminent attack by hostile powers. For purposes of this warning the collaborative efforts of the current intelligence resources of the departments and CIA are brought together through the IAC Watch Committee. It is expected that by the end of FY 1953 the individual and cooperative efforts should be more sensitive in the detection of hostile threats as well as current trends which necessarily have a bearing upon National Estimates and policy matters.

6. Collection: The guidance for those resources devoted to collection activities both overt and covert should be materially improved by virtue of the foregoing programs although the nature of the Soviet society will greatly limit our achievement. Programs are being designed to exploit more effectively certain available sources of overt foreign intelligence information which have hitherto gone unexploited. Although by far the greatest quantity of intelligence information can be collected by overt means, much

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7. With respect to the foregoing discussion of U. S. intelligence programs, it should be noted that our intelligence system is confronted by certain limitations which will inevitably result in a margin of uncertainty

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both in our estimates and in our ability to give early warning of attack. These limitations arise from the security consciousness and practices of the Soviet State; the high state of war preparations of the Soviet; their flexibility in making decisions and the speed with which, under their system, such decisions can be implemented.

Related Activities

8. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned in support of the President's programs will require increasing financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large. However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers for this work. Personnel needs will require increased reliance on Armed Service personnel.

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James Q. Reber
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e. National Intelligence Survey: The production schedule for NIS has been revised during the last year to take into account changed world conditions. It is expected that the goals established for the coming year will be substantially met with the existing resources available for this program. This year's program will be the equivalent of eight complete country national intelligence studies. This will leave approximately 60% of the high priority areas to be completed.

5. Current intelligence programs are of course related to both operational and strategic needs of the departments and the President and are keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to provide warning of imminent attack by hostile powers. For purposes of this warning the collaborative efforts of the current intelligence resources of the departments and CIA are brought together through the IAC Watch Committee. It is expected that by the end of FY 1953 the individual and cooperative efforts should be more sensitive in the detection of hostile threats as well as current trends which necessarily have a bearing upon National Estimates and policy matters.

6. Collection: The guidance for those resources devoted to collection activities both overt and covert should be materially improved by virtue of the foregoing programs although the nature of the Soviet society will greatly limit our achievement. Programs are being designed to exploit more effectively certain available sources of overt foreign intelligence information which have hitherto gone unexploited. Although by far the greatest quantity of intelligence information can be collected by overt means, much

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9 April 1952

of the most critical information needed can be obtained, if at all, only by clandestine means. The objective here, because of the difficulty of the target, namely, the Soviet orbit, must be to define clearly the most important targets. United States efforts in clandestine operations are relatively new and the number of personnel trained and qualified as is necessary for successful operation is small. Clandestine intelligence, therefore, must be viewed in the long perspective of 15 to 20 years and our objectives for the Fiscal Year 1953 call for the elimination of marginal targets and greater concentration on the significant targets, the building up of operational bases and nets which inevitably require a great deal of time and are frequently faced with setbacks arising from counterespionage activities of the enemy or detection and exposure of our effort. By the end of this period considerable strides will have been made toward isolating the most essential elements of information which must be collected by covert means giving proper attention to priorities. There has been some success in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and satellites by clandestine technological and scientific means. The achievement of greater success in this field is to a great extent dependent on the establishment of arrangements for cooperative concentration of efforts.

7. With respect to the foregoing discussion of U. S. intelligence programs, it should be noted that our intelligence system is confronted by certain limitations which will inevitably result in a margin of uncertainty

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both in our estimates and in our ability to give early warning of attack. These limitations arise from the security consciousness and practices of the Soviet State; the high state of war preparations of the Soviet; their flexibility in making decisions and the speed with which, under their system, such decisions can be implemented.

Related Activities

8. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned in support of the President's programs will require increasing financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large. However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers for this work. Personnel needs will require increased reliance on Armed Service personnel.

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27 March 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

REVISION OF ANNEX 6 TO NSC 114/2

1. The President has requested that NSC 114/2 be brought up to date. There has been in both the NSC 114/2 and its previous form in NSC 68 an Annex devoted to intelligence.

2. The attached draft has been prepared through the cooperation of representatives of the IAC and is hereby submitted for approval of the IAC. It will be considered at the meeting on 3 April.

James Q. Reber
Secretary

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Class. Changed to:	TS (S)C
Next Review Date:
Auth:	HR 70-3
Date:	10-21-91
By:	233768

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27 March 1952

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27 March 1952

Draft Annex No. 6

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

Foreign Intelligence

1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must increase its efforts if it would audit the Soviet world's strength and estimate with the required accuracy its intentions and chances of success, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of increased success in this regard. Improvement in the intelligence product is dependent in considerable measure upon other factors such as the refinement of our collection targets, the effectiveness of the collection effort, the skill with which sources are exploited and information is evaluated and conclusions drawn. Expansion is nevertheless essential in the intelligence agencies of the State and Military departments, if the intelligence community is to be adequately prepared for the period of greatest danger ahead, for the increased demands for intelligence service created in large part by the programs set forth elsewhere in this paper, and for the inevitable intelligence build-up which would be required in

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the event of a spread of hostilities. While the increased funds necessary to support this expansion are negligible in relation to the entire program, they have not in fact been allocated, and in general it may be said that the departmental intelligence agencies find themselves with no greater resources in personnel and logistic support than they possessed in 1950.

2. The improvement of U. S. foreign intelligence is an important objective and one closely related to the policies recommended here since our estimates of foreign intentions and capabilities bearing on the East-West struggle are directly dependent upon the effectiveness of our intelligence organization. To improve the over-all value of their product, the intelligence agencies must focus upon these essentials:

First, they must make certain that the substantive objectives controlling their collection, research and estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and others which confront the National Security Council.

Second, both the collection and research activities of the several intelligence agencies must be so developed and related that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.

3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee, composed of the chiefs

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of each of the intelligence agencies is of great assistance in focusing the attention of the intelligence community on these continuing efforts. It is also increasingly effective as a means of achieving coordination on National Intelligence Estimates, and of reaching agreement on the coordination of various other intelligence activities.

4. The IAC agencies, in recognition of the need for strengthening the collection of intelligence information bearing upon the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and Soviet Orbit countries, have made renewed efforts to exploit available overt information. In spite of some success, however, much of the most critical information needed can be obtained, if at all, only by clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine collection are greatly magnified within the Soviet Orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where State surveillance restricts opportunities for penetration. The enormous difficulties of such clandestine activities strain available resources of qualified personnel and may be expected to increase the costliness of such operations. The resources and possibilities available for covert collection are therefore and will necessarily continue to be insufficient to provide all the critical information required in these areas. In

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order to make the maximum use of these capabilities, intelligence agencies have made considerable strides toward isolating the most essential elements of information which must be collected by covert means, giving proper attention to priorities. Increasing success is also being achieved in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and its satellites by technological and scientific means. In the collection and analysis of foreign electro-magnetic radiation we have not yet achieved a fully coordinated effort.

5. While the quality of national and departmental intelligence research is heavily dependent upon the intelligence information collected, it is also dependent on a properly coordinated division of labor among the agencies and on the timely availability of the research product. In this regard it is felt that the National Intelligence Estimates are making a significant contribution. There has been notable progress in the coordination of atomic energy intelligence and steps are being taken to improve coordination in other aspects of scientific and technical intelligence production. There is also under way a coordinated program for the systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies. This should provide a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR, and should suggest possible avenues of U. S. counter-action by exposing economic vulnerabilities. The agencies have continued

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their collaborative efforts to watch Soviet or Soviet Orbit developments in order to detect any short-range warning of an intent to launch a military attack on the West.

6. Intelligence agencies suffer from inadequate numbers of well-qualified personnel and inadequate space arrangements to meet their responsibilities in collection and research production. While qualified personnel are difficult to attract in the face of the competition of other employers, both inside and outside the Government, some of the departments have been seriously hampered in this respect by budgetary difficulties and uncertainties.

Related Activities

7. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned in support of the foreign or military policies of the Government can be expected to require increasing financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large. However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers for this work. It is expected that increasing reliance on Armed Service personnel will be required.

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

REVISION OF ANNEX 6 TO NSC 114/2

1. The President has requested that NSC 114/2 be brought up to date. There has been in both the NSC 114/2 and its previous form in NSC 68 an Annex devoted to intelligence.

2. The attached draft has been prepared through the cooperation of representatives of the IAC and is hereby submitted for approval of the IAC. It will be considered at the meeting on 3 April.

James Q. Reber
Secretary

Document No.	
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Draft Annex No. 6

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

Foreign Intelligence

1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must increase its efforts if it would audit the Soviet world's strength and estimate with the required accuracy its intentions and chances of success, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of increased success in this regard. Improvement in the intelligence product is dependent in considerable measure upon other factors such as the refinement of our collection targets, the effectiveness of the collection effort, the skill with which sources are exploited and information is evaluated and conclusions drawn. Expansion is nevertheless essential in the intelligence agencies of the State and Military departments, if the intelligence community is to be adequately prepared for the period of greatest danger ahead, for the increased demands for intelligence service created in large part by the programs set forth elsewhere in this paper, and for the inevitable intelligence build-up which would be required in

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the event of a spread of hostilities. While the increased funds necessary to support this expansion are negligible in relation to the entire program, they have not in fact been allocated, and in general it may be said that the departmental intelligence agencies find themselves with no greater resources in personnel and logistic support than they possessed in 1950.

2. The improvement of U. S. foreign intelligence is an important objective and one closely related to the policies recommended here since our estimates of foreign intentions and capabilities bearing on the East-West struggle are directly dependent upon the effectiveness of our intelligence organization. To improve the over-all value of their product, the intelligence agencies must focus upon these essentials:

First, they must make certain that the substantive objectives controlling their collection, research and estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and others which confront the National Security Council.

Second, both the collection and research activities of the several intelligence agencies must be so developed and related that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.

3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee, composed of the chiefs

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of each of the intelligence agencies is of great assistance in focusing the attention of the intelligence community on these continuing efforts. It is also increasingly effective as a means of achieving coordination on National Intelligence Estimates, and of reaching agreement on the coordination of various other intelligence activities.

4. The IAC agencies, in recognition of the need for strengthening the collection of intelligence information bearing upon the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and Soviet Orbit countries, have made renewed efforts to exploit available overt information. In spite of some success, however, much of the most critical information needed can be obtained, if at all, only by clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine collection are greatly magnified within the Soviet Orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where State surveillance restricts opportunities for penetration. The enormous difficulties of such clandestine activities strain available resources of qualified personnel and may be expected to increase the costliness of such operations. The resources and possibilities available for covert collection are therefore and will necessarily continue to be insufficient to provide all the critical information required in these areas. In

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order to make the maximum use of these capabilities, intelligence agencies have made considerable strides toward isolating the most essential elements of information which must be collected by covert means, giving proper attention to priorities. Increasing success is also being achieved in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and its satellites by technological and scientific means. In the collection and analysis of foreign electro-magnetic radiation we have not yet achieved a fully coordinated effort.

5. While the quality of national and departmental intelligence research is heavily dependent upon the intelligence information collected, it is also dependent on a properly coordinated division of labor among the agencies and on the timely availability of the research product. In this regard it is felt that the National Intelligence Estimates are making a significant contribution. There has been notable progress in the coordination of atomic energy intelligence and steps are being taken to improve coordination in other aspects of scientific and technical intelligence production. There is also under way a coordinated program for the systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies. This should provide a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR, and should suggest possible avenues of U. S. counter-action by exposing economic vulnerabilities. The agencies have continued

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their collaborative efforts to watch Soviet or Soviet Orbit developments in order to detect any short-range warning of an intent to launch a military attack on the West.

6. Intelligence agencies suffer from inadequate numbers of well-qualified personnel and inadequate space arrangements to meet their responsibilities in collection and research production. While qualified personnel are difficult to attract in the face of the competition of other employers, both inside and outside the Government, some of the departments have been seriously hampered in this respect by budgetary difficulties and uncertainties.

Related Activities

7. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned in support of the foreign or military policies of the Government can be expected to require increasing financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large. However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers for this work. It is expected that increasing reliance on Armed Service personnel will be required.

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

REVISION OF ANNEX 6 TO NSC 114/2

The President has requested that NSC 114/2 be brought up to date. There has been in both the NSC 114/2 and its previous form in NSC 68 an Annex devoted to intelligence.

A copy of the last edition of Annex 6 relating to Intelligence is attached hereto as TAB B. The proposed revision is at TAB A. It will be appreciated if your representative would meet in my office, Room 2007 M Building, at 2:30 P.M. Thursday, 27 March, to criticize this draft prior to its submission to the IAC on 3 April.

James Q. Reber
Secretary

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Auth.: HM 70-3
Date: 10-21-91
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22 March 1952

Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000300110001-5

Draft Annex No. 6

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

Foreign Intelligence

1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must increase its efforts if it would audit the Soviet world's strength and estimate with the required accuracy its intentions and chances of success, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of increased effectiveness. Some further expansion may indeed be necessary in some of the intelligence agencies, but in general improvement in the intelligence product is dependent upon other factors such as the refinement of our collection targets and the skill with which information is evaluated and conclusions drawn. The increased funds necessary to support the intelligence activities required in the State and Military departments, while important to the intelligence effort, are not of a magnitude to require consideration in this paper. Furthermore, the importance of these funds is not dependent on the policies and programs contained in the main body of this paper.

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2. The improvement of US foreign intelligence is nevertheless an important objective and one closely related to the policies recommended here since our estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities is directly dependent upon the effectiveness of our intelligence organization. To improve the over-all value of their product, the intelligence agencies must focus upon three essentials:

First, they must make certain that the substantive objectives controlling their collection, research and estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and others which confront the members of the National Security Council.

Second, both the collection and research activities of the several intelligence agencies must be so synchronized that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.

Third, they must constantly seek to strengthen their capabilities and resources in order to improve the quality and reliability of their product, whether in the collection or research field.

3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee, composed of the chiefs of each of the intelligence agencies is of great assistance in focusing the attention of the community on these three continuing efforts. It is also increasingly effective as a means of achieving coordination on National Intelligence Estimates, and of reaching agreement on the coordination of various other intelligence activities.

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4. The IAC agencies, in recognition of the need for strengthening the collection of intelligence information bearing upon the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union and Soviet Orbit countries, have made renewed efforts to exploit overt sources of information. In spite of some success, however, much if not most of the critical information needed will continue to be unavailable except by covert means. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine collection are greatly magnified within the Soviet Orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where State surveillance restricts opportunities for penetration. The enormous difficulties of such clandestine activities strain available resources of qualified personnel and may be expected to increase the costliness of such operations. The resources and possibilities available for covert collection are therefore and will necessarily continue to be insufficient to provide all the critical information required in these areas. In order to make the maximum use of our limited possibilities, intelligence agencies have made considerable strides toward isolating the most essential elements of information which must be collected by covert means, giving proper attention to priorities. Increasing success is also being achieved in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and its satellites by technological and scientific means, although in the electromagnetic field we have not yet achieved adequate coordinated effort.

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5. While the quality of national and departmental intelligence research is heavily dependent upon the intelligence information collected, it is also dependent on a properly coordinated division of labor among the agencies and on the timely availability of the research product. In this regard it is felt that the National Intelligence Estimates are making a significant contribution. There has been notable progress in the field of Atomic Energy intelligence and it is hoped that in other aspects of scientific and technical intelligence comparable satisfactory arrangements can be developed. There is also under way a promising coordinated program for the systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies. This should provide a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR, and should suggest possible avenues of US counter-action by exposing economic vulnerabilities. The agencies have also intensified their collaborative efforts to watch Soviet or Soviet Orbit developments on a continuing basis in order to detect any short-range warning of an intent to launch a military attack on the West.

6. All of the intelligence agencies suffer from inadequate numbers of well-qualified personnel and inadequate space arrangements to meet their responsibilities in collection and research production. While qualified personnel are difficult to attract in the face of the

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competition of other employers, both inside and outside the Government, some of the departments have been seriously hampered in this respect by budgetary difficulties and uncertainties.

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22 March 1952

Annex No. 6

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the intelligence product is dependent not only upon increased collection of reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is obtaining personnel skilled in collection and evaluation.

2. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in clandestine intelligence and related activities. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of construction. A sizeable portion of that strength should consist of personnel from the armed forces.

3. Policies approved in NSC 86/1 for the encouragement and asylum of defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit are being studied in order that interdepartmental responsibilities for the safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of defectors may be further refined. This study is being conducted with a view toward recommending to National Security Council such action as may be appropriate.

4. To improve the over-all value of their intelligence product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three essential parts of their program:

First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to the political and military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.

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Second, the activities of the intelligence agencies of the government must be so synchronized that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.

Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their capabilities and resources.

5. It is especially important that collection facilities of the national intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being made to establish accurate priorities of essential elements of information. This requirement is especially important in the field of clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties are encountered.

6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It should likewise suggest possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its satellites.

7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific intelligence itself) but much remains to be accomplished in this field, especially in view of the difficulties encountered in "conventional" clandestine activities.

8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is required by law to correlate the intelligence produced by each in order to ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time by recommendation to the National Security Council, he can initiate action to prevent duplication of effort or overlapping of one agency upon the field of action or functions of another. The Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with responsibility for services of common concern which can most advantageously be performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process of coordination, there is still need for improvement.

9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange of opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC provides a means whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can comment upon, concur in, or object to recommendations, proposals, or conclusions regarding problems of national intelligence concern.

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22 March 1952

10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant military or political events, there has been created an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically all incoming reports and to be alert for indications of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission and for evaluation of these indications are constantly being improved.

11. a. More and more critical information within the USSR and its satellites must be sought by clandestine means, either directly or scientifically. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine collection are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where state surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration. Not only do the enormous difficulties of such clandestine activities strain available resources of qualified personnel but they may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus require increasingly greater expenditures.

b. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities. Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation. In the opinion of the Intelligence Advisory Committee representatives of the Armed Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it impossible to maintain even this minimum program. The Department of State indicates difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.

12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet relationships emphasizes the immediate need for intensification of intelligence and related activities. Additional funds and personnel will continue to be required, not only for expansion of the intelligence services but for the improvement in the quality of their product, which neither now or in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that the planners and policy makers desire.

b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently taxed with expanded requirements, must adequately prepare for

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vast expansion in the event of the spread of hostilities. If the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain their present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for the execution of these tasks.

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COPY NO. 4

29 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, National Estimates
Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence
Assistant Director, Research and Reports
Assistant Director, Current Intelligence
Assistant Director, Collection and Dissemination
Assistant Director, Operations
Assistant Director, Special Operations
Assistant Director, Policy Coordination
Assistant Director, Communications
Assistant Director, Personnel

SUBJECT: Revision of NSC 114/2

1. The President has requested that NSC 114/2 be brought up to date. There has been in both the NSC 114/2 and its previous form in NSC 68 an Annex devoted to intelligence.

2. A copy of the last edition of Annex 6 relating to Intelligence is attached hereto. It will be appreciated, in the event that your office has any views with respect to modifications in this paper, if you would send a representative to a meeting to be held in my office, Room 2007 M Building, at 2:30 P.M., Tuesday, 4 March.

JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

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Director of Training

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Annex No. 6

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the intelligence product is dependent not only upon increased collection of reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is obtaining personnel skilled in collection and evaluation.

2. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in clandestine intelligence and related activities. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of construction. A sizeable portion of that strength should consist of personnel from the armed forces.

3. Policies approved in NSC 86/1 for the encouragement and asylum of defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit are being studied in order that interdepartmental responsibilities for the safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of defectors may be further refined. This study is being conducted with a view toward recommending to National Security Council such action as may be appropriate.

4. To improve the over-all value of their intelligence product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three essential parts of their program:

First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to the political and military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.

Second, the activities of the intelligence agencies of the government must be so synchronized that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.

Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their capabilities and resources.

5. It is especially important that collection facilities of the national intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being made to establish accurate priorities of essential elements of information. This requirement is especially important in the field of clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties are encountered.

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6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It should likewise suggest possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its satellites.

7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific intelligence itself), but much remains to be accomplished in this field, especially in view of the difficulties encountered in "conventional" clandestine activities.

8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is required by law to correlate the intelligence produced by each in order to ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time by recommendation to the National Security Council, he can initiate action to prevent duplication of effort or over-lapping of one agency upon the field of action or functions of another. The Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with responsibility for services of common concern which can most advantageously be performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process of coordination, there is still need for improvement.

9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange of opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC provides a means whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can comment upon, concur in, or object to recommendations, proposals, or conclusions regarding problems of national intelligence concern.

10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant military or political events, there has been created an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically all incoming reports and to be alert for indications of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission and for evaluation of these indications are constantly being improved.

11. a. More and more critical information within the USSR and its satellites must be sought by clandestine means, either directly or scientifically. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine collection are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where state surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration. Not only do the enormous difficulties of such clandestine activities strain available resources of qualified personnel but they may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus require increasingly greater expenditures.

b. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities. Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum program to meet fixed commitments

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can be met only with the greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation. In the opinion of the Intelligence Advisory Committee representatives of the Armed Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it impossible to maintain even this minimum program. The Department of State indicates difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.

12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet relationships emphasizes the immediate need for intensification of intelligence and related activities. Additional funds and personnel will continue to be required, not only for expansion of the intelligence services but for the improvement in the quality of their product, which neither now or in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that the planners and policy makers desire.

b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently taxed with expanded requirements, must adequately prepare for vast expansion in the event of the spread of hostilities. If the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain their present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for the execution of these tasks.

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1 October 1951

RECOMMENDED PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH THE SUMMARY
EVALUATION REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH 2 OF NSC ACTION 543

The following proposal has been submitted by General Partridge on behalf of the JCS in response to General Smith's request for a suggestion as to procedure of NSC Action 543. This will be discussed at the next IAC meeting.

"Over-all

The Director of Central Intelligence should invite JCS, ICIS, and IIC to participate in creation of an ad hoc committee composed of one (1) senior officer or official of flag rank from JCS, ICIS, IIC, and IAC. The four members of the ad hoc committee should:

a. Scan the collated studies submitted in response to paragraph 1 of NSC Action 543 and allocate among themselves responsibility for summary evaluations in accordance with areas of interest.

b. In preparing summary evaluations, create small sub-committees by calling upon the membership of the Groups they represent as needed and desired.

c. Review as a body the results of subparagraph b above and prepare the over-all summary evaluation for submission to the NSC."

JAMES Q. REBER

Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Attached for information is the final version of Annex 6 for the revision of NSC 68/4. This text has been agreed to by the IAC acting through its authorized representatives. It has been forwarded by the Director of Central Intelligence without change to the NSC Staff.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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13 September 1951

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the intelligence product is dependent not only upon increased collection of reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is obtaining personnel skilled in collection and evaluation.

2. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in clandestine intelligence and Related Activities. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of construction. A sizeable portion of that strength should consist of personnel from the armed forces.

3. Policies approved in NSC 86/1 for the encouragement and asylum of defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit are being

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studied in order that interdepartmental responsibilities for the safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of defectors may be further refined. This study is being conducted with a view toward recommending to NSC such action as may be appropriate.

4. To improve the overall value of their intelligence product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three essential parts of their program:

First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to the political and military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.

Second, the activities of the intelligence agencies of the government must be so synchronized that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.

Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their capabilities and resources.

5. It is especially important that collection facilities of the national intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being made to establish accurate priorities of essential elements of information. This requirement is especially important in the field of clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties are encountered.

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6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It should likewise suggest possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its satellites.

7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific intelligence itself), but much remains to be accomplished in this field, especially in view of the difficulties encountered in "conventional" clandestine activities.

8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is required by law to correlate the intelligence produced by each in order to ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time by recommendation to the NSC he can initiate action to prevent duplication of effort or overlapping of one agency upon the field of action or functions of another. The Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with responsibility for services of common concern which can most advantageously be performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process of coordination, there is still need for improvement.

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9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange of opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC provides a means whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can comment upon, concur in, or object to recommendations, proposals, or conclusions regarding problems of national intelligence concern.

10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant military or political events, there has been created an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically all incoming reports and to be alert for indications of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission and for evaluation of these indications are constantly being improved.

11. a. More and more critical information within the USSR and its satellites must be sought by clandestine means, either directly or scientifically. The ordinary difficulties of "conventional" clandestine collection are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where state surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration. Not only do the enormous difficulties of such clandestine

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activities strain available resources of qualified personnel but they may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus require increasingly greater expenditures.

b. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities. Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation. In the opinion of the I.A.C. representatives of the Armed Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it impossible to maintain even this minimum program. The Department of State indicates difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.

12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet relationships emphasizes the immediate need for intensification of intelligence and Related Activities. Additional funds and personnel will continue to be required, not only for expansion of the intelligence services but for the improvement in the quality of their product, which neither now or in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that the planners and policy-makers desire.

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b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently taxed with expanded requirements, must adequately prepare for vast expansion in the event of the spread of hostilities. If the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain their present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for the execution of these tasks.

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11 September 1951

PROPOSED ANNEX 6 TO THE NSC PAPER
ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS
FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY

1. There is attached hereto a revised draft of Annex 6 to be submitted to the NSC for inclusion with a revision of "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC 68/4).

2. In view of the fact that substantial agreement was reached in the IAC meeting of September 10th, informal clearance will be asked on the attached revised draft.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the intelligence product is dependent not only upon increased collection of reliable foreign intelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and assembled in the form of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is personnel skilled in collection and analysis.

2. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of construction. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in intelligence and Related Activities. A sizeable proportion of that strength should consist of personnel from the armed forces.

3. Policies approved in NSC 86/1 for the encouragement and asylum of defectors from the Soviet Union and its orbit make it

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necessary to review and fix more definitely interdepartmental responsibilities to ensure the safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of defectors.

4. To improve the overall value of their intelligence product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three essential parts of their program:

First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in field activity, research, and estimates are properly related to the political and military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.

Second, they must allocate responsibility among intelligence agencies of the government that the resources and activities of each are so synchronized as to provide for maximum support for the attainment of these objectives.

Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their capabilities and resources.

5. It is especially important that collection facilities of the national intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being made in the establishment of an accurate priority of essential elements of information. This requirement is especially important in the field of clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties are encountered.

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6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It should likewise suggest possible avenues of U.S. counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its satellites.

7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence by scientific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific intelligence itself), but much remains to be accomplished in this field.

8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national intelligence agencies, the Director of Central Intelligence is required by law to correlate the activities of each in order to ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time by recommendation to the NSC he can initiate action to prevent duplication of effort or overlapping of one agency upon the field of action or functions of another. The Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with responsibility for services of common concern which can most advantageously be performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process of coordination, there is still need for improvement.

9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been

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increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange of opinion among intelligence chiefs. The IAC provides a means whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can comment upon, concur in, or object to recommendations, proposals, or conclusions regarding problems of mutual concern.

10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant military or political events there has been created an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically all incoming reports and to be alert for indications of critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission and for evaluation of these indications are constantly being improved.

11. a. In the projection of intelligence programs, it is anticipated that more and more critical information within the USSR and its satellites must be sought by covert and clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of clandestine operations are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where virtually the entire population is covered with a vast counterespionage net and where state surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration. Not only do the enormous difficulties of such clandestine operations strain available resources of qualified personnel but they may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus require increasingly greater expenditures.

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b. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities. Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation. In the opinion of the I. A. C. representatives of the Armed Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it impossible to maintain even this minimum program. The Department of State indicates difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.

12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet relationships emphasizes the immediate need for intensification of intelligence and related activities. Extraordinary difficulties exist especially in the collection of clandestine intelligence within the Soviet orbit where state surveillance and mass counterespionage activity stringently limit access to critical information. Additional funds and personnel will continue to be required, not only for expansion of the intelligence services but for the improvement in the quality of their product, which neither now or in the foreseeable future is likely to be all that the planners and policy-makers desire.

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b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently taxed with expanded requirements as the result of hostilities in Korea and rearmament in Europe, must adequately prepare for vast expansion in the event of the spread of hostilities. If the intelligence services are to prepare for these wartime operations while undertaking commitments that currently strain their present capabilities, it is imperative that they obtain sufficient personnel and the logistical support required for the execution of these tasks.

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7 September 1951

PROPOSED ANNEX 6 TO THE NSC PAPER
ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS
FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY

1. There is attached hereto a revised draft Annex 6 to be submitted to the NSC for inclusion with a revision of "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC 68/4). This draft is the result of discussion with the IAC representatives on Friday, 7 September.
2. The IAC is reminded of the Annex 6 on intelligence which was submitted with the original NSC 68 and of the progress report which was submitted as approved by the IAC (IAC-D-29) which eventually came out under NSC 114.
3. The NSC Directive for the development of the present study requests a review of the current programs including analysis of difficulties encountered and recommendations regarding any revisions or modifications.
4. It is not possible to define intelligence programs in the same way that war production programs or military or economic aid programs may be defined nor are the sums of money involved of the same magnitude. This paper attempts to point out this difference and to state in the broad sense what the intelligence program is, describing developments in regard thereto and some of the difficulties encountered.
5. In view of the fact that this Annex is due at the NSC Staff on 10 September this paper is placed on the IAC agenda for urgent consideration at the meeting on Monday, 10 September.

JAMES Q. REBER

Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

1. Because of the peculiar nature of intelligence operations, it becomes difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the integrity of the intelligence product is dependent not only upon increased production and collection of foreign intelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and upon the intellectual competence with which it is interpreted in the preparation of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is personnel-- personnel recruitment, training, and utilization.

2. Intensification of Related Activities can be more specifically programmed. However, the unique nature of such undertakings precludes detailed examination here. Although adequate funds have been budgeted for support of these related activities, difficulties in the recruitment and training of both U. S. and foreign personnel restrict the rate of expansion. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of construction. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in Related

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Activities. A sizeable proportion of that strength will consist of uniformed personnel from the armed forces.

3. Policies approved in NSC 86/1 for the encouragement and asylum of defectors from the Soviet and its orbit make it necessary to review and fix interdepartmental responsibilities to ensure the safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of all such defectors.

4. To improve the integrity of their intelligence product, the national intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three essential parts of their program:

First, they must make certain that substantive targets in research, field activity, and estimates are in support of political and military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.

Second, they must make certain under the existing division of responsibility among intelligence agencies of the government that the resources and activities of each are so synchronized as to provide for maximum support.

Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their capabilities and resources.

5. It is especially important that we achieve maximum effectiveness in the collection facilities of the national intelligence agencies.

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Efforts are being made in this direction particularly in the selection of what is to be collected and in what priority. This need is especially acute in clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties and hazards exercise serious limitations on what we might expect from such sources.

6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic analysis of the Soviet and satellite economies provides opportunity for better appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It likewise suggests possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its satellites.

7. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national intelligence agencies the Director of Central Intelligence correlates the activities of each with its consent and concurrence to ensure that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time he endeavors by recommendation to the NSC to prevent dissipation of effort in the overlapping or encroaching of one agency upon the roles and prerogatives of another. Central Intelligence is likewise charged with responsibility for services of common concern which can be most advantageously performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process of synchronization, there is still further need for improvement.

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8. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each of the departmental intelligence agencies has been increasingly helpful in facilitating consultation and the exchange of opinion among intelligence chiefs. For IAC provides a device whereby the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can comment upon, concur, or object to recommendations, proposals, or conclusions regarding problems of mutual concern. (*)

9. To guard against political or military surprise there has been created an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically those current indications which might forecast critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission and for evaluation of these indications are constantly being improved.

10. a. In the projection of intelligence programs, it is anticipated that more and more critical information within the USSR and its satellites must be sought by covert and clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of clandestine operations are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where virtually the entire population forms a vast counterespionage net and where state surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration. Not only do the enormous difficulties of such clandestine operations strain available resources of

(*) CIA and State support the inclusion of this paragraph, which the other representatives would prefer to omit.

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qualified personnel but they may be expected to multiply in costliness and thus require increasingly greater expenditures.

b. With regard to intelligence programs other than covert or clandestine, however, this situation does not obtain. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly with the allocation of personnel and facilities. Present limitations operate to the effect that a minimum program to meet fixed commitments can be met only with the greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying increasing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation. Within the Departments of Defense, presently directed personnel cuts will make it impossible to maintain even this minimum program. The Department of State has also experienced difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.

11. Lack of sufficient, secure, and convenient space in which to house intelligence headquarters activities has taxed several of the agencies in their effectiveness and jeopardized the security of their undertakings. Within CIA, however, this strain is expected to be eased with construction of a headquarters building designed to house securely the anticipated personnel strength of that agency for FY 1953. Funds have been authorized and construction, it is anticipated, may be completed in eighteen months. Should this project be impeded or delayed, Central Intelligence would

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be severely handicapped in executing its existing programs for expansion. No such improvement in space available to other intelligence agencies, however, is in prospect.

12. Current planning for the improvement and intensification of intelligence and related activities is believed adequate for the period under review. Implementation within the Department of Defense, however, is contingent upon the attainment of currently allocated personnel and facilities. Currently directed reallocations in personnel below allowances will preclude obtainment of present objectives.

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 5 September 1951

PROPOSED ANNEX 6 TO THE NSC PAPER
ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS
FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY

1. There is attached hereto a draft Annex 6 to be submitted to the NSC for inclusion with a revision of "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC 63/4).

2. The IAC is reminded of the Annex 6 on intelligence which was submitted with the original NSC 68 and of the progress report which was submitted as approved by the IAC (IAC-D-29) which eventually came out under NSC 114.

3. The NSC Directive for the development of the present study requests a review of the current programs including analysis of difficulties encountered and recommendations regarding any revisions or modifications.

4. It is not possible to define intelligence programs in the same way that war production programs or military or economic aid programs may be defined nor are the sums of money involved of the same magnitude. This paper attempts to point out this difference and to state in the broad sense what the intelligence program is, describing developments in regard thereto and some of the difficulties encountered.

5. In view of the fact that this Annex is due at the NSC Staff on 10 September this paper is placed on the IAC agenda for urgent consideration at the meeting on Thursday, 6 September.

JAMES Q. REBER
 Secretary
 Intelligence Advisory Committee

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1. However intently we strive toward the fulfillment of goals in military buildup, foreign aid, and arms production, the adequacy of this effort will hinge in large part upon the accuracy with which we compute the capabilities of the USSR and its satellites, thereafter upon the efficiency with which we estimate their intentions. To calculate that Soviet strength, to anticipate the uses to which it may be put, where and when and under what circumstances, is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence and the national intelligence system. Every shred and source of information must be exploited if it is to yield the data we seek and thus help us to perceive the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet as well as the vulnerabilities of other nations. Most important, however, is the quality of this information, the quality and comprehensiveness of intelligence research and the character of the estimates derived from both.

2. Because of the peculiar nature of intelligence operations, it becomes difficult to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those employed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals. While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet world's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself offers no guarantee of the increased probity intelligence must attain. Improvement in the integrity of the intelligence

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product is dependent not only upon increased production and collection of foreign intelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and upon the intellectual competence with which it is interpreted in the preparation of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is personnel--personnel recruitment, training, and utilization.

3. Intensification of covert related activities can be more specifically programmed. However, the unique nature of such undertakings precludes detailed examination here. Although adequate funds have been budgeted for support of these related activities, difficulties in the recruitment and training of both U. S. and foreign personnel restrict the rate of expansion. Expanded domestic and overseas facilities for training are presently in process of construction. Existing plans contemplate expansion within the next two years to three times the current strength of personnel engaged in related activities. A sizable proportion of that strength will consist of uniformed personnel from the armed forces.

Policies approved in NSC 86/1 for the encouragement and asylum of defectors from the Soviet and its orbit are as yet too recent to permit sound evaluation of that program. However, should these policies stimulate a sizable increase in the number of defectors, it will become necessary to review and fix inter-departmental responsibilities that adequate provision may be made for the safekeeping, resettlement, and rehabilitation of all such defectors.

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4. To improve the integrity of its intelligence product, the national intelligence system must focus added emphasis upon three essential parts of its program:

First, it must make certain that substantive targets in research, field activity, and estimates are in support of both present and anticipated political and military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.

Second, it must make certain under the existing division of responsibility among intelligence agencies of the government that the resources and activities of each are so synchronized as to provide for maximum support.

Third, it must constantly re-assess and strengthen the capabilities and resources of each of the component members of the intelligence system.

5. It is especially important that we achieve maximum effectiveness in the collection facilities of the national intelligence system. Efforts are being made in this direction particularly in the refining of what is to be collected and in what priority. This need is especially acute in clandestine collection where extraordinary difficulties, hazards, and costs exercise serious limitations on what we might expect from such sources.

6. Important beginnings have been made during the last year on a systematic analysis of the Soviet and its satellite economies. At the same time progress has been made in the sifting of extra-governmental projects in basic economic research. Economic analysis has become a critical factor in any meaningful appraisal of the capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It likewise suggests possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by

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exposing the vulnerabilities of the USSR and its satellites to political and economic undertakings.

7. Increasingly closer correlation is required between intelligence agencies and policy planners in the executive agencies of government. If maximum use is to be made of intelligence, both collecting and estimating offices should be apprised of incipient policy decisions. For unless timely notification is provided, intelligence agencies may be handicapped in their endeavor to provide the support they may be capable of rendering.

8. In the coordination of intelligence among departmental agencies within the intelligence system, Central Intelligence monitors the activities of each with its consent and concurrence to ascertain that no gaps are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time it acts to prevent dissipation of effort in the overlapping or encroaching of one agency upon the roles and prerogatives of another. Central Intelligence is likewise charged with responsibility for services of common concern as well as those services which can be most advantageously exercised centrally. While progress has been made in this process of synchronization, there is still further need for improving and developing new arrangements for working together in even closer cooperation.

9. By making increasingly greater use of the Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each of the departmental intelligence agencies, jurisdictional issues have been more facilely resolved and a valuable

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forum established for consultation and exchange of opinion among intelligence chiefs. In the machinery provided by this committee the chief of intelligence of each agency of government can comment upon, alter, concur, or object to recommendations, proposals, or conclusions regarding day-by-day problems of national intelligence concern.

Equally important has been the role of the IAC in the production of national estimates. After assembling and fusing the contributions of each intelligence agency, CIA drafts, in cooperation with each, a national intelligence estimate on the situation. The final draft of this estimate is then subjected to the scrutiny of the IAC itself for concurrence, revision, or dissent. Thus this final processing insures that each estimate shall accurately reflect the viewpoints and reservations of each separate agency within the intelligence system. And as a result each estimate that is produced is the product of the national intelligence system rather than of the agency in which final synthesis takes place.

10. To guard against political or military surprise there has been created an interdepartmental Watch Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically those current indications which might forecast critical moves. Facilities for prompt transmission of these indications are constantly being improved.

11. With the buildup in U. S. military forces overseas, it has become necessary to review the working relationships that exist between military authorities and CIA field personnel. Although existing relationships have

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been improved, mutually satisfactory arrangements on the projected activities of CIA in wartime theaters of operations have yet to be achieved.

12. In the projection of intelligence programs, it is anticipated that more and more critical information within the USSR and its satellites must be sought by covert and clandestine means. The ordinary difficulties of clandestine operations are hugely magnified within the Soviet orbit where surveillance severely restricts opportunities for penetration. No problems are anticipated in budgetary support for the added costliness of such operations. And while intelligence personnel goals are ambitious, it is anticipated they can be met.

13. Lack of sufficient, secure, and convenient space in which to house intelligence headquarters activities have taxed several of the agencies in their effectiveness and jeopardized the security of their undertakings. Within CIA, however, this strain is expected to be eased with construction of a headquarters building designed to house securely the anticipated personnel strength of that agency for FY 1953. Funds have been authorized and construction, it is anticipated, may be completed in eighteen months.

14. Current planning for the improvement and intensification of intelligence and related activities is believed adequate and satisfactory results are anticipated within the period under review.

IAC-A-42

6 September 1951

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

AGENDA

Director's Conference Room, First Floor
Administration Building, CIA
on ~~Thursday, 6 September~~ 1951, at 1030 hours
Monday, 10 September

-
1. Approval of Minutes of last meeting, held 30 August 1951 (IAC-M-43)
 2. Soviet Capabilities for Surprise Attack on the Continental United States before July 1952 (Part I SE-10) Dr. Langer
 3. Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of 1951 (NIE-41) Dr. Langer
 4. Annex 6 Revision NSC 68 (NSC 114) (IAC-D-29/1) Colonel Hansen
 5. Progress Report (IAC-PR-17)

James Q. Reber
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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NSC 114 (REVIEW OF NSC 68/4)

1. The review of NSC 68/4, of which you have been aware, has been submitted to the National Security Council as NSC 114.

2. Enclosed herewith for your information are four excerpts from NSC 114 of particular interest to the IAC.

TAB A. Part I (paragraphs 1-12), which is largely, but not exclusively, a summary of Appendix A (see subparagraph c below).

TAB B. Paragraphs 45-49 from Part II. These paragraphs are a summary of Annex No. 6 (see subparagraph d below).

TAB C. Appendix A, Changes in the World Situation Since the Completion of NSC 68. The original draft of this Appendix was prepared in the Department of State. It has been amended pursuant to oral consultation between O/NE and IAC representatives and to collation with the 26 July text of NIE-25. (Other amendments were made by State, Defense, ODM and JCS members of the NSC drafting team.)

TAB D. Annex No. 6, as amended by the IAC.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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1. As anticipated in NSC 68 (April 1950), the Soviet rulers have continued in relentless pursuit of the Kremlin design. In Korea they have demonstrated a willingness to take actions which involve grave risk of precipitating global war. Such risk-taking appears to be closely calculated: The U.S.S.R. has exercised considerable care and restraint to avoid open and direct involvement. Nevertheless, the Kremlin's willingness to accept such risk has been greater than was foreseen in NSC 68.

2. Since April, 1950 the U.S.S.R. has intensified its deliberate and systematic campaign to prepare the Russian people psychologically for possible war with the United States. A similar campaign is being carried out in the European satellites and China.

3. The U.S.S.R. is militarily substantially stronger than it was in April, 1950. Furthermore, the increase in military strength in-being of the Eastern European satellites since April, 1950 has been large, and alone probably offsets the increases which have been achieved in Western Europe. The Chinese communist regime has considerable military capabilities at its disposal, has undertaken military action in the Soviet interest, and thus far, at least, has made progress in consolidating its control in China. Evidence from various sources during the past year shows that Soviet military production is of high quality--and of higher quality than had previously been estimated. The ability of the U.S.S.R. to develop large military capabilities where none existed a few years ago as in North Korea, has been shown in the Korean war and this has required a revision of earlier judgments regarding satellite military potentials. On all these counts, NSC 68 presented a prospect which was more favorable for the United States than now appears to have been warranted.

4. Nothing has occurred within the Soviet empire which requires a revision of earlier judgments that the regime is capable of maintaining its control over the Russian people and its satellites.

5. Notably in Korea, and elsewhere as in Iran and the Balkans, situations have developed which could more easily issue in general war by accident or miscalculation than was foreseen fifteen months ago.

6. As anticipated in NSC 68, the Kremlin regards most seriously the prospect of United States and Western rearmament generally. It is highly sensitive to German and Japanese rearmament and the establishment of American Bases overseas. Its principal immediate

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purpose is to frustrate these programs. Its presently indicated course of action to that end is to exploit all opportunities to split the Western Allies, particularly the United States and the UK, and to conduct a specious peace campaign designed to exploit both fear of a new general war and reluctance to make the sacrifices necessary to redress the balance of power. There is a serious danger, which may become acute if a cease-fire in Korea is agreed to, that by such wiles the U.S.S.R. may yet lull the free world into a false sense of security, with adverse effect upon both its military posture and its political cohesion. If, however, the United States demonstrates determination and progress in meeting its commitments to build the strength of the free world to the level at which it can deter or defeat Soviet aggression, and if Soviet conciliation is seen to present no real assurances of peace and security, it is likely that the alignment of the West can be maintained and its strength further developed.

7. If and when it becomes apparent to the Kremlin that the Western alliance and projected rearmament cannot be disrupted and frustrated by political and psychological means the danger of Soviet preventive action will become acute.

8. The free world has made important progress in organizing itself to meet the Soviet threat. UN action to counter Communist aggression in Korea, the development of NATO, progress with respect to the Schuman and Plevan plans, the successful conference of American foreign ministers, progress on the Japanese peace treaty and on Pacific security arrangements, all indicate in some degree a developing cohesion and awareness of common peril. This progress is impressive in relation to normal expectation, but has been slow and unsatisfying in relation to the abnormal exigencies of the situation. The United States and its allies have moved less rapidly than envisaged in NSC 68/4 toward exploiting their vastly superior economic potential to improve their over-all power position vis-a-vis the Soviet system. NATO planning has yet to be translated into effective military strength in being. Tangible support for the UN cause in Korea has left much to be desired. In general, Far Eastern issues have tended to divide the free world. Moreover, the situation in Iran and the Arab states has deteriorated beyond all expectation.

9. The level of military production in the United States is not currently meeting the military readiness targets indicated in NSC 68/4, which moved forward the military readiness level contemplated for July 1, 1954, to July 1, 1952. The detailed materiel programs developed subsequent to the approval of force levels on December 14, 1950, were finally approved when the military budget for FY 1952 was approved on April 19, 1951. In the interim, however, available funds were used to expand the production base and to get long lead time items into production on an expanded basis. The flow of military assistance to allied countries has lagged behind the targets contemplated in NSC 68/4, in part because of the materiel requirements

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needed to support United Nations forces in Korea. The level of military production in Western Europe has been inadequate to support the objectives of our economic and military assistance programs. In the earlier phases of our build-up, the output of military equipment has been a more serious limitation on the building of military strength than the first drafts upon our manpower resources. The limitation on the availability of military equipment stems from such as the following: the recent date of final approval of the detailed materiel programs; the practical problem of reducing long lead time required for military equipment such as tanks, aircraft, ships, tactical radio, motorized equipment, and heavy construction items; delay in administrative actions which could have made tools and facilities available at an earlier date; organizational problems in production facilities; the decision to expand the production base and concurrently to secure delivery of end items; as well as a psychological situation less favorable than that existing at the time of adoption of NSC 68/4.

10. The estimates of Soviet atomic capabilities contained in NSC 68 have been revised upwards. It is now estimated that the U.S.S.R. will have in mid-1953 the atomic stockpile formerly estimated for mid-1954. The date when a surprise attack on the United States might yield decisive results is correspondingly advanced.

11. Although a thorough examination of the subject is not now available, the strength-in-being of the U.S. and its allies has probably increased in absolute terms less than that of the Soviet system since April 1950. The mobilization effort of the United States and its allies has brought them closer to the actualization of their potential than in April 1950. The date at which this mobilization effort will enable them to achieve the capability of supporting the objectives outlined in NSC 68 is still some time off, certainly later than was expected when the NSC 68/4 programs were developed. The question of comparative capabilities and the rates of increase in capabilities is of such importance that a careful assessment should be obtained as rapidly as possible.

12. Review of the world situation shows that the danger to our security is greater now than it was in April 1950. It is greater now than it was then thought it would now be. Fifteen months ago 1954 was regarded as the time of maximum danger. It now appears that we are already in a period of acute danger which will continue until the United States and its allies achieve an adequate position of strength.

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Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities

45. The Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee have taken and are taking action directed toward the improvement and intensification of foreign intelligence and related activities. For reasons of security, the specific programs undertaken and contemplated and their budgetary requirements are not set forth here. It has been determined, however, that even the substantially increased budgets required are inconsiderable in relation to the grand total of the other programs described in NSC 68/4.

46. Since September 1950 there has been substantial progress in the development of cooperation and coordination among the several intelligence agencies through the active utilization of the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a means to that end. Although detailed problems remain to be solved, an effective system of coordination has been established and that aspect of the program may be said to have been completed.

47. An intensification of intelligence and related activities, to the extent feasible with the means available, has also been accomplished. Further progress depends on the augmentation of personnel and facilities. The projected expansion of CIA and the departmental agencies is, in general, about half completed.

48. All intelligence agencies have experienced difficulty in finding and recruiting properly qualified personnel. Only the intelligence organization of the Department of State has had notable difficulty in obtaining adequate budgetary provision for personnel expansion. Lack of adequate and suitable office space has hindered development responsive to NSC 68.

49. Present programs for the improvement and intensification of intelligence and related activities are deemed to be the most practicable in the circumstances. Their substantial completion by mid-1952 is anticipated.

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APPENDIX A

CHANGES IN THE WORLD SITUATION SINCE THE COMPLETION OF NSC 68/4

PART ONE: THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET BLOC

1. Objectives. The U.S.S.R. has given no indication that its objectives have changed since April 1950. Indeed all available evidence leads to the conclusion that the Soviet rulers are as convinced as ever of the basic correctness of their policy and are still intent upon unyielding pursuit of the following goals:

a. The eventual establishment of a Communist world dominated by the U.S.S.R. This basic objective, in addition to traditional Marxian "world revolution" motivation, probably arises from a Kremlin conviction that the vital interests of the U.S.S.R. can be assured over the long run only by the elimination of all governments it cannot control. This conviction is probably based in turn on a Kremlin belief that peaceful coexistence of the U.S.S.R. and its empire, on the one hand, and the U.S. and its allies, on the other, is impossible and that an armed conflict between them is eventually inevitable.

b. As essential steps toward realization of this basic objective, the Soviet rulers in the current situation appear to be seeking to:

(1) Maintain an advanced state of war-readiness and offset any increase in the capabilities of the U.S. and its allies.

(2) Prevent the development of any threat to the vital interests of the U.S.S.R. or to Soviet control of the satellites;

(3) Expand the territorial limits of the Soviet orbit;

(4) Undermine and secure control of governments not yet under Soviet domination;

(5) Divide the U.S. from its allies and cause the countries of the free world generally to deny their resources, including strategic sites, to the U.S.

c. Developments since April 1950 and growing in part out of the Korean war have apparently caused the Soviet rulers to place primary emphasis in their foreign policy on those of the above immediate aims that relate to preventing Western (notably West German and Japanese) rearmament and implementation of the U.S. overseas bases policy.

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2. Military capabilities. The U.S.S.R. since April 1950 has substantially improved the capability of its military forces in being. It has brought Soviet and satellite military units to an advanced state of battle readiness and has so deployed them in advance positions that they could, in any critical area of continental Europe or Asia, move virtually without further mobilization and concentration and without additional logistical, organizational, and training preparations; it has accelerated the modernization of the Soviet armed forces--including the conversion of the air force to jets, the construction and extension of airfields in the U.S.S.R. and the satellites, and the extension of its radar net within both the U.S.S.R. proper and the satellites; and it has taken further important steps toward placing the Soviet and satellite economies on a war footing. Military forces of the European satellites, including East Germany, have been increased from 671,000 in the spring of 1950 to 862,000 at present, and substantial progress has been made toward Sovietizing them in weapons, organization and training. Present Soviet military capabilities are estimated as follows:

a. The Soviet and satellite armed forces retain the capability of overrunning continental Europe and the Near and Middle East (except India and Pakistan) within a relatively short period. Both military and non-military stocks, with the possible exception of aviation fuel, are in sufficient quantity and so distributed as generally to permit sustained military operations during that period even though U.S. atomic capabilities were fully exercised against strategic targets in the U.S.S.R.

b. In the Far East, North Korea and Chinese Communist forces, with Soviet logistical and technical support, have demonstrated a military capability greater than had been previously estimated. In the event of general war, it would not be in the over-all security interests of the United States to commit our forces to the defense of the mainland of Asia. Communist forces must therefore be credited with the ability to overrun East and Southeast Asia, and threaten the security of the off-shore island defense line.

c. The U.S.S.R. does not now have, and, even if it should seize the Eurasian continent and the U.K., would be unlikely to secure adequate naval forces and sufficient shipping to permit it to mount a successful invasion of the Western Hemisphere.

d. The Soviet Air Force continues capable of providing adequate tactical support to all ground campaigns which the U.S.S.R. might launch against continental Europe and the Near and Middle East (except India and Pakistan) and simultaneously of attempting a strategic air offensive against the United Kingdom and the North American continent.

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c. Soviet atomic capabilities have increased roughly at the rate anticipated in April 1950, but are expected to increase more rapidly in the next three years than was previously estimated. These capabilities, while substantial, remain inferior to those of the U.S. It is impossible, however, to estimate with assurance the Kremlin's conclusion with regard to the relative effectiveness of the Soviet and U.S. atomic warfare capabilities or with regard to the relative importance of atomic and conventional weapons in determining the issue of a future general war.

3. Economic capabilities. The U.S.S.R. has not succeeded since April 1950 in reducing the overwhelming economic superiority of the West. At the conclusion of the recently completed Fourth Five-Year Plan, total Soviet-satellite industrial capacity remained approximately one-fourth that of the NATO powers. Moreover, the trend during the past year indicates that in the short run at least the existing gap will widen. However, the U.S.S.R. has continued and even extended measures that enable it to translate its own and satellite economic resources into military power in being. In consequence, Soviet strength, at least for immediate military purposes, continues largely unaffected by the economic inferiority of the U.S.S.R. and the satellites.

4. Psychological capabilities. Although developments since April 1950, particularly those related to Korea, may have served to weaken somewhat the impact of Moscow's propaganda on free peoples, Soviet capabilities for psychological warfare--both offensive and defensive--have not been materially reduced. The combination of the Soviet propaganda apparatus with the world-wide network of local Communist parties and front societies continues to give the Soviet Union an organizational advantage for its propaganda efforts. Soviet control of all informational media within the U.S.S.R. and Soviet jamming of foreign broadcasts gives the Kremlin a near monopoly in moulding the thinking of the Soviet peoples on international affairs. By alternating "war scare" techniques and appeals to the universal longing for peace, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrably produced during the past year disruptive effects on Western efforts to deal collectively with basic security problems. Domestically, a new trend has appeared in the Soviet anti-American campaign. This trend has been marked by charges (1) that the U.S. has moved from preparation of aggression to acts of aggression, and (2) the U.S. has committed "unforgivable" crimes against the Russian people and plans to repeat these crimes. These charges have been principally pegged on accounts of alleged U.S. atrocities in Korea and the U.S. "intervention campaign" against Russia of 1918-20. The effect of this new development is obviously to increase the psychological preparation of the Soviet people for possible war.

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5. Internal stability of the Soviet regime. Evidence received since April 1950 indicates that tensions continue within the U.S.S.R. Moreover, developments with regard to a collective farm merger program suggest that the regime may be encountering unusual peasant opposition. However, the Kremlin, through utilization of police state techniques, appears capable of successfully suppressing any difficulties that may arise. It must be concluded, therefore, that the regime will continue in power and will not be compelled to modify any of its external policies because of internal pressures.

6. Stability of and degree of Soviet control over European satellite regimes. It is apparent that since April 1950 stresses and strains have developed in the European satellites. These are principally economic in nature, but appear to have some political potentialities, particularly as regards increasing anti-Russian sentiment. The difficulties seem to result from the combined impact of the military preparedness effort, Western trade restrictions, over-ambitious industrialization programs, and agrarian problems. There are no indications that the difficulties are sufficiently serious to jeopardize the Communist regimes, to reduce the firm grip of Soviet control over these regimes, or to prevent them from undertaking any action demanded by the Kremlin. The military capabilities and the general war readiness of the European satellites have substantially increased since April 1950, the rate of increase being in fact greater than was estimated at that time.

7. Stability and degree of control over Far Eastern satellites.

a. Since April 1950 the Kremlin has been able to secure large-scale military action furthering its own interests from its satellite regime in North Korea and from the Chinese communists. During the Korean war the size of the Chinese communist military establishment has been increased. However, deployment to Korea and Manchuria of major portions of their best forces, increased internal police requirements, and the logistic strain of the Korean war have reduced present Chinese communist capabilities for additional external military operations.

b. While the Korean war has not yet posed a critical threat to the economic stability of the Chinese communist regime, the war has subjected and will continue to subject the regime to increasingly serious economic difficulties. These difficulties are almost certain to increase during the next year if Western trade restrictions are rigorously applied.

c. The Korean war has increased the dependence of the Chinese Communists on the U.S.S.R., but apparently has not materially changed Sino-Soviet relations. There are areas of conflicting interests which make rumors of mutual dissatisfaction plausible, but we have no firm evidence to substantiate

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these rumors. The Korean war has placed strains upon the internal political, military and economic position of the Chinese Communist regime. While these strains have not yet become critical, they might well become so if the war were prolonged. Whatever may have been the economic and internal political consequences suffered by the Chinese as a result of taking such military action, there is as yet no firm indication that the Chinese communist regime has been jeopardized or that Soviet influence over the regime has been reduced.

8. Threat of the U.S.S.R. to U.S. security. The Soviet rulers since April 1950 have shown through their actions in Korea a greater willingness to assume risks in the pursuit of their objectives than was estimated at that time. Moreover, the Soviet rulers have revealed during the same period intense sensitivity over efforts of the West to strengthen its military position and have increasingly resorted to threats over the consequences likely to ensue from continuation of these efforts. The threat to U.S. security posed by Soviet policies and capabilities appears therefore, to have increased since April 1950.

a. The Kremlin has since April 1950 stepped up its drive to destroy the freedom of the Western world through political warfare and has given every indication that it will further intensify this drive in the future. For example, with the immediate objective of dividing the Western powers, undermining U.S. mobilization, obstructing the NATO program and frustrating prospective German and Japanese rearmament and with the ultimate objective of paralyzing opposition to communism, the Kremlin may adopt the tactic of encouraging the West to hope for a settlement of outstanding issues by mutual agreement, without, however, intending to surrender any present element of Soviet strength or abandoning its objective. The Kremlin will continue to press its "peace" campaign, to exploit the fear of war in Europe, to raise hopes of German unification, and to use the communist parties of France and Italy in an attempt to confound the political situation and obstruct effective government. Similarly, wherever in the world non-communist governments are weak, as in Iran, Indochina, and Burma, the Kremlin will continue efforts to strengthen the communist position and, if favorable situations develop, will support communist coups.

b. The Kremlin through its action in Korea has made clear that there is a continuing possibility that it may supplement political attack by the employment of satellite military forces to secure local objectives. In such cases the U.S.S.R. would give technical and logistic support to the satellite forces involved. If necessary, Soviet "volunteers" might be provided. In addition, it must be considered a continuing

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possibility that where no satellite forces are available, as in Iran, Soviet forces themselves will be employed for local purposes. Any such aggression would involve risk of general war developing or of the West suffering losses that would undermine its power position.

c. There continues a possibility that the U.S.S.R. may at any time deliberately resort to general war against the U.S. It appears that the most important immediate objective of the Kremlin is to divide the West and to halt Western, West German, and Japanese rearmament. If the Kremlin should fail to make sufficient progress toward that end by methods short of general war and if in addition it should become convinced that its superiority in conventional forces was about to be offset, the Kremlin would seriously consider resort to war. It is apparent that for some time U.S., NATO, West German, and Japanese rearmament is unlikely to progress to the point where the Kremlin would need to regard it as an immediate threat to Soviet vital interests. However, in evaluating the prospect of the Kremlin's actually resorting to war, recognition must be given to (1) the fact that Soviet forces are in an advanced state of war-readiness and could initiate general war at any time with little or no warning, and (2) the possibility that the Kremlin might at any time misinterpret Western defensive measures as an effective threat to the vital interests of the U.S.S.R.

d. There continues a possibility of general war developing at almost any moment from an action or series of actions not intended to produce that result. The Kremlin might, for example, miscalculate the degree of risk involved in a particular action or underestimate the cumulative effect of several actions. Or, it might regard a particular local action as so necessary or so advantageous as to warrant assuming even a serious risk of general war. In any event, the international situation is so tense that some issue might develop to a point beyond control.

e.- Particularly is it possible that the Korean situation will get out of hand. If the conflict in Korea continues, or is renewed after a cease fire, the U.S.S.R. will probably continue to aid the Communist forces in ways which the Kremlin estimates would not involve serious danger of a break between the U.S.S.R. and U.S./UN. If, however, the communist forces in Korea were threatened with decisive defeat, the Kremlin would probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the introduction of "volunteer" forces. It might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto local war between the U.S./UN and the U.S.S.R. would exist. At every stage the Kremlin would probably endeavor to keep open the possibility of ending the Korean conflict by political negotiation if the global interests of the U.S.S.R. would be served by disengagement in Korea.

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PART TWO: THE POSITION OF THE FREE WORLD

1. Western Europe

a. Military Effort. As is the case in the United States, the provision of military equipment presents the major problem in raising the effective strength in being of the Western European countries. MDAP deliveries have been slower than was anticipated. As of April 30, 1951, only 53% of the material programmed in fiscal 1950 and 2% of that programmed in fiscal 1951 had been shipped to port. The personnel strengths of the NATO countries have shown some increases due to lengthened conscription periods and increases in military budgets. National defense expenditures of the European NATO countries, based on budgetary allocations, have increased approximately 35 percent (from 5.3 billion dollars in the calendar year 1950 to an estimated 8.2 billion in 1951). However, the rate of expansion has not been as extensive as was desired or hoped for by the United States.

b. Internal Economic Conditions. The speed-up in Western rearmament programs has required the European countries to expand the proportion of their increasing total output which is directed to military purposes and to augment their total budgetary expenditures. At the same time, it has raised the prices and put pressure on the supplies of the raw materials that Western Europe must import. It further appears that the reduction in living standards associated with the speed-up of European rearmament programs will be rather inequitably distributed through mounting inflationary pressures. Although these economic problems have raised obstacles to developing and maintaining popular support for European rearmament programs, they have not critically affected the political or economic strength and stability of Western Europe.

c. Internal Political Strength. Popular communist strength increased in recent Italian municipal elections and remained formidable in the French national elections and some strength also accrued to extreme right-wing groups in both elections. The extreme Right is, at the same time, becoming more powerful in West Germany, where it derives support from large refugee elements, whose plight presents a continuing problem. On balance, it can be said that the process of political polarization has continued in Western Europe since April 1950, but has not seriously affected such leadership as the present center political groups have been able to provide in the major countries of this area. Continuation of this trend toward polarization would have an adverse effect on the internal strength and stability of such countries.

d. Political Cohesion. The U.S. leadership and U.N. solidarity shown in the initial Western reaction to the invasion of the Republic of Korea stimulated anti-communist

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morale in Western Europe. Faith in U. S. leadership was subsequently somewhat shaken by the pressure for a more aggressive policy in Korea that developed in this country but has probably been restored by the recent full public explanation of the U.S. policy in the Far East and by the negotiations for an armistice. Progress has been made in carrying forward the NATO program. The U.K. and France also displayed an ability to stand against Soviet pressures at the Paris Deputies' meeting. Some progress has, in addition, been made in implementing policies which would eventually render West Germany an equal, independent, and willing ally of the West. On balance, therefore, it can probably be said that the cohesion of Western Europe as an element in the world wide anti-Kremlin front has been strengthened since April 1950.

2. Africa and the Near East

As against the situation in April 1950, the Western position in the Near East has, except in Greece and Turkey, deteriorated. The problems arising from Israeli-Arab hostility, colonial-Western antagonism, and backward economic conditions have not approached solution and have in some cases grown more critical. The readiness of the Near Eastern countries, once again excluding Greece and Turkey, to accept Western leadership is even less in evidence than was the case in the spring of 1950.

a. The Arab Near East. Tensions between Israel and the Arab states have, if anything, heightened over the past 15 months, and anti-Western sentiment among the Arabs has solidified. British relations with Egypt, which involve among other things the issue of traffic through the Suez Canal, have worsened substantially, as have prospects for stability in Egypt. As an aftermath of developments in Iran, the British and American position in other oil concession countries, notably in Iraq, is more vulnerable to nationalist attack. In general, pro-Western political forces in the entire Arab area have lost ground since the spring of 1950.

b. Greece and Turkey. The passage of time since April 1950 has brought some accretion of strength in Greece and Turkey. In both countries, military forces have had an additional period of training and have absorbed additional U. S. equipment. Turkey has demonstrated an impressive degree of political maturity under its new government and political instability in Greece is certainly no more an upsetting factor than it was at the earlier date.

c. Iran. The present crisis in Iran threatens the free world with the loss of a large quantity of oil products, the U.K. with the loss of substantial revenues, and Iran with

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political anarchy and a possible Communist assumption of power.

d. Morocco. The French show no signs of abating their opposition to the nationalist movement in Morocco or of trying to forestall it by timely concessions; nor have French repressive measures been successful in reducing the amount of native support accorded the nationalist movement. It must thus be said that the continued confrontation of colonial and nationalist forces in Morocco has, since April 1950, worsened the prospects for political stability in this strategic area.

3. South Asia and the Far East.

a. India's foreign policy, as unfolded in connection with the Korean war and related issues, is further removed from that of the West than was the case in April 1950. More importantly, the position of the Congress Party in India has been weakened by a strengthening of both leftist and rightist elements.

Tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has increased to the point where actual hostilities threaten the entire subcontinent. The obscure dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan is as far from being settled as ever and, because of Pakistan's suspicions that India is acting in support of Afghanistan, it further contributes to the unsettled political situation in South Asia.

b. The prospects of the present moderate government in Burma appear, on the whole, less favorable than in April 1950. The Chinese communists are extending, and have the capability of increasing military aid to communist insurgent forces. Should these forces succeed in allying themselves to other rebel groups in Burma, the position of the government might become untenable, at least in the absence of greatly increased external military aid.

c. In Malaya, the Philippines, and Indo China, the internal struggles that were underway in April 1950 are continuing. In the Philippines, the government has been somewhat more effective lately in its anti-Huk operations, but has made no appreciable progress in coping with the basic and, if anything, worsening economic problems of the Islands. In Malaya, the relative positions of the government and guerrilla forces remain approximately the same. This in itself may be taken as a deterioration in the position of the government, which has expended large resources in an effort to repress a military movement whose indefinite continuation would eventually pose a threat to British rule. In Indo China, after the initial improvement in the French position associated with

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the change of military command, the struggle is once more apparently stalemated. If increased Chinese Communist intervention should materialize after an end of hostilities in Korea, it could tip the present precarious military balance of power in this area against the French.

d. In Korea, the hostilities beginning in June 1950 have ravaged and disorganized the country. The Republic of Korea will need considerable U.S. economic and military aid if even part of the war damage is to be rehabilitated, if political stability is to be maintained, and if the ROK is eventually to be rendered capable of defending itself against future subversion or attack by North Korea.

e. Japan. Progress has been made toward a peace settlement with Japan without U.S.S.R. or Chinese communist participation, and with a continuation of U. S. military protection. A basis for Japanese rearmament is thus being provided, although Japanese will and ability to solve the political and economic problems involved in rearmament have yet to be demonstrated.

4. Latin American Republics.

In spite of readjustments occasioned by increased rearmament of the U.S. and Western Europe, the economic position of Latin America has considerably improved since April 1950. Political stability of the area has in general remained unchanged. With respect to the East-West struggle, the Latin American countries have, with a few exceptions, notably Guatemala, evinced greater willingness to collaborate with the U. S. and the U.N. in the fields of economic and political warfare as well as in matters of military preparedness.

July 26 1951

Annex No. 6

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, with the
concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.)

I. What is the present program?

1. It is axiomatic that the situation appreciated in NSC 66 and the policies and programs adopted to meet it require the improvement and intensification of US foreign intelligence and related activities, as a safeguard against political or military surprise, and as essential to the conduct of the affirmative program envisaged.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies represented on Intelligence Advisory Committee have taken and are taking action directed toward the improvement and intensification of foreign intelligence and related activities. For reasons of security, the specific programs undertaken and contemplated and their budgetary requirements are not set forth here. It has been determined, however, that even the substantially increased budgets required are inconsiderable in relation to the grand total of the other programs described in NSC 68/4.

II. To what extent has this program been completed?

3. Coordination. Since September 1950 there has been substantial progress in the development of cooperation and coordination among the several intelligence agencies, principally through the active utilization of the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a means to that end. The most notable specific measures contributing to this result have been:

a. A reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency to eliminate duplication of departmental activities and to develop agencies for inter-departmental coordination and for the provision of services of common concern.

b. Establishment of the Office of National Estimates, including the National Estimates Board, as a means of developing and coordinating national intelligence estimates.

c. Establishment of the Office of Research and Reports and of the Economic Intelligence Committee as means of coordinating basic research in certain fields of common interest, with special reference to the multifarious and hitherto uncoordinated field of economic intelligence, and for the conduct of certain research of common interest.

d. Establishment of an interdepartmental Watch Committee for the systematic review of current indications as a safeguard against surprise.

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July 26 1951

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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
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I. What is the present program?

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d. Establishment of an interdepartmental Watch Committee for the systematic review of current indications as a safeguard against surprise.

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e. Establishment of joint policy and authorization for the establishment (with participation therein by the three military services, the Department of State, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency) of an Armed Services Documents Intelligence Center, an Armed Services Personnel Interrogation Center, and a Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency, for the exploitation of intelligence derived from captured sources.

Although detailed problems of coordination may remain to be solved, an effective system of coordination and spirit of cooperation have been established. In this sense it may be said that this aspect of the program has been completed.

4. Intensification. An intensification of foreign intelligence and related activities, to the extent feasible with the means available, has already been accomplished. Further progress depends on the augmentation of personnel and facilities. A review of the situation as regards both CIA and the departmental agencies supports the generalization that their projected expansion is about half accomplished and that present goals will be substantially attained by mid-1952.

III. What are the difficulties encountered?

5. All of the intelligence agencies have experienced difficulty in the recruitment of properly qualified personnel. The basic difficulty is in actually finding desirable recruits rather than in the budgetary and procedural aspects of the matter, although the time lag in security clearances has proved a hindrance in some cases and one departmental agency -- that in State -- has experienced difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate personnel expansion.

6. Another difficulty is that of obtaining adequate and suitable provision of office space. That problem is particularly acute as regards CIA and the State intelligence organization. The existing situation not only presents security hazards and uneconomic operational inefficiencies, but also hinders development responsive to NSC 68.

7. The major difficulty incident to the successful prosecution of programs continues to be the fact that the collection of information necessary for the production of intelligence on critical areas such as the USSR and its satellites has become increasingly dependent upon covert means. At present information collected by such means is considered to be inadequate. The difficulties in the way of covert collection in the USSR are admittedly of the highest magnitude and covert collection can not be accepted as a substitute for the development of new and scientific means.

IV. What is the adequacy and timing of the present programs?


8. Present programs for the improvement and intensification of intelligence and related activities are deemed to be the most practicable in the circumstances. Their substantial completion by mid-1952 is anticipated.

CIA 36305

IAC-D-28/2

1 July 1953

Copy No. 9




INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Progress Report on the Activities of the IPC

1. On 30 July 1951, the IAC established the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC). It has thus been in existence approximately two years.

2. Attached is the first formal report of the work of that Committee submitted to the IAC members for their information and comment as desired at the IAC meeting to be held on 14 July 1953.

3. This report is being distributed in one copy only to the members of the IAC for their personal and confidential use in keeping with the sensitive nature of the business of this Committee.


Secretary

IAC-D-28/2

1 July 1953

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IAC-D-28/2

1 July 1953

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Progress Report on the Activities of the IPC

1. The Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) was created on 30 July 1951 by IAC-D-28/1, for the purpose of:

a. Determining those foreign information requirements of the U. S. Government which require collection by clandestine means.

b. Preparing and maintaining a current listing of those clandestine collection targets deemed to have a priority status in terms of the over-all interests of the U.S. Government, and

c. Representing the Intelligence Advisory Committee member agencies on matters pertaining to their respective interests in the field of clandestine collection of foreign information including: selection and establishment of priority standing for clandestine collection targets; diversion or concentration of clandestine collection capabilities.

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[REDACTED]

regard to the relative priority importance of its selected targets vis-a-vis the importance of any other Agencies' targets was not questioned. The capabilities of CS/CIA in these areas were not discussed in detail at that time except that it was realized clandestine resources were limited, the hazards great, and satisfaction of these targets should not be expected in the near future. It was agreed that the preparation of target dossiers for detailed collection planning purposes would be obtained from each requesting agency on the initiative of CS/CIA. To date, CS/CIA has gone beyond the operational planning stage into the developments of operations [REDACTED] by Army, Navy, Air and AEC. CS/CIA has indicated that it will

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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proceed as rapidly with regard to the remaining targets as the improvement of its operational capabilities permit.

3. A target list for the EUROPEAN SATELLITE areas was prepared and agreed upon by the IPC with the understanding that where existing operations are confronted by a need to select between alternative targets, such selection by the IPC is to be based insofar as possible on the priority guidance provided by DCID-4/2. Additionally, when it becomes operationally possible for CS/CIA to attack targets in this area, it approaches the appropriate IPC Members with a request for a detailed briefing on requirements for the target(s) in keeping with capabilities of the agent(s) involved. This procedure will continue to be followed.

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5. The principles referred to in paragraph 3 also apply to COMMUNIST CHINA. Targets are currently and actively being pursued in line with their criticality in respect to the wars in Korea and Indochina and their relationship to the military forces of Communist China. A consolidated listing of these targets is in the process of preparation.

6. A consolidated target list on the NEAR EAST-AFRICA area has been prepared and accepted by the IPC. It should be noted that in some instances these targets are also capable of some overt coverage by other Agencies of the Government, particularly the Department of State. Because of changing conditions in this area, it is not practicable to define precisely, in each instance, the exact extent of CS/CIA responsibilities, as opposed to those of the other collectors. Where detailed guidance can usefully be provided, CS/CIA will follow its usual practice of seeking such guidance.

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8. In order to acquaint the IPC as a body with CS/CIA's clandestine collection capabilities against priority targets in the Soviet Orbit area [REDACTED] the Members, in the course of regular meetings held in the first quarter of 1953, were briefed on CS/CIA's operations against the targets which they had submitted. These briefings confirmed that CS/CIA's efforts are principally directed toward covering military intelligence targets in keeping with the priority established by DCID-4/2. Similar briefings of the IPC will be conducted periodically.

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9. The IPC is presently in the process of reviewing its Satellite targets in order to insure that they reflect the current priority needs of the member Agencies, and utilize CS/CIA's capabilities to the maximum extent. Similar reviews will also be made of targets in other areas, as appropriate.

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CIA No. 36180

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-28/1

30 July 1951

IAC COVERT REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE

1. The following revision of IAC-D-28 is distributed to take into account the changes approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee in its establishment of the Subcommittee on this subject and in providing these terms of reference for its guidance.

2. It will be appreciated if the Agencies would submit the names of their principal and alternate members to the Office of Intelligence Coordination by telephone, Code 143, ext. 766, by Wednesday, August 1.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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1001-5-28/1
30 July 1951

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE INTERAGENCY CLANDESTINE
COLLECTION PRIORITIES COMMITTEE

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCIDs Numbers 1 and 5, the Intelligence Advisory Committee hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. There is hereby established under the Intelligence Advisory Committee the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Interagency Priorities Committee or I.P.C."). The Interagency Priorities Committee will perform the following functions in connection with the clandestine collection of foreign information outside the U. S. and Possessions and related problems:

a. In accordance with general priorities given by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, to determine those foreign information requirements of the U. S. Government which require collection by clandestine means and prepare and maintain a current listing of those clandestine collection targets deemed to have a priority status in terms of the over-all interests of the U. S. Government.

b. To represent the Intelligence Advisory Committee member agencies on matters pertaining to their respective interests in the field of clandestine collection of foreign information including: selection and establishment of priority standing for clandestine collection targets; diversion or concentration of clandestine collection capabilities.

c. In order that the priority lists referred to above be as realistic as possible, and to insure maximum utilization of the resources of CIA, it would be necessary that the members of the committee be briefed on a need-to-know basis on the capabilities of CIA for clandestine collection, by areas.

2. The Interagency Priorities Committee (IPC) will be composed of one principal and one alternate member from each of the following Departments and Agencies: The Department of State, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. The Interagency Priorities Committee members will be vested with authority to represent their respective Departments or Agencies on matters pertaining to the clandestine collection of foreign information outside the United States and its Possessions in the performance of the functions set forth in Paragraph 1, and each Department or Agency will be represented at each meeting by at least one member, with the necessary power to act.

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30 July 1951

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4. Decisions of the Interagency Priorities Committee will be based on the consensus of the members. When decision cannot be reached, the Interagency Priorities Committee will promptly refer the matter for resolution to the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

5. As used in this directive, "clandestine collection activities" are understood to be intelligence collection activities or operations, whether by agent, reconnaissance, patrol or observation, which are conducted or sponsored by the U. S. Government, in order to acquire intelligence on foreign states or groups, but which are planned and conducted in such a manner that:

a. Any U. S. Government responsibility for the clandestine activities is not evident to unauthorized persons, or

b. The U. S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them if uncovered, or

c. Although conducted in accordance with paragraphs a. and b. above, a calculated risk is taken that disclosure or compromise would be justified by the results expected.

6. As the agency of primary responsibility in the field of clandestine collection of foreign information outside the United States and its Possessions, the Central Intelligence Agency shall name the Chairman and establish the necessary Secretariat for the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee.

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IAC COVERT REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE

1. In pursuance of the action of the IAC at its meeting of last Thursday, representatives of the agencies met and agreed to recommend to the IAC the establishment of a subcommittee for the coordination of requirements for covert collection. There is attached hereto for approval a draft terms of reference submitted by the Navy and concurred in by the representatives at the meeting except as indicated in brackets.

2. Also in pursuance of the IAC instruction that immediate steps be taken with regard to sorting out priority requirements in critical areas in Eastern Europe, the group agreed as a first step to prepare by August 6th, agency lists of critical targets which will subsequently be arranged in order of priority.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-28
24 July 1951

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DEVELOPMENT OF COORDINATED REQUIREMENTS FOR CLANDESTINE COLLECTION

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID's Numbers 1 and 5, the Intelligence Advisory Committee hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. There is hereby established under the Intelligence Advisory Committee the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Interagency Priorities Committee or I.P.C."). The Interagency Priorities Committee will perform the following functions in connection with the clandestine collection of foreign information outside the U. S. and Possessions and related problems:

a. Determine those foreign information requirements of the U. S. Government which require collection by clandestine means and prepare and maintain a current listing of those clandestine collection targets deemed to have a priority status in terms of the over-all interests of the U. S. Government.

b. Exercise all powers of decision for Air dissent: "to represent" the IAC member agencies on matters pertaining to their respective interests in the field of clandestine collection of foreign information including: selection and establishment of priority standing for clandestine collection targets; diversion or concentration of clandestine collection capabilities.

c. In order that the priority lists referred to above be as realistic as possible, and to insure maximum utilization of the resources of CIA, it would be necessary that the members of the committee be briefed on a continuing basis on the capabilities of CIA for clandestine collection, by areas.

2. The Interagency Priorities Committee (IPC) will be composed of one principal and two alternate members from each of the following Departments and Agencies: The Department of State, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. The Interagency Priorities Committee members will be vested with authority to represent their respective Departments or Agencies on matters pertaining to the clandestine collection of foreign information outside the United States and its Possessions in the performance of the functions set forth in paragraph one, and each Department or Agency will be represented at each meeting by at least one member, with the necessary power to act.

4. Decisions of the Interagency Priority Committee will be based on the principal of unanimity which shall be a prerequisite for matters within the purview of the I.P.C., except that the Chairman shall be elected by majority vote. When decision cannot be reached, the Interagency Priorities Committee will promptly refer the matter for

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resolution to the Intelligence Advisory Committee [provided that when unanimity is not obtained between the Service department members of the Department of Defense, the I.P.C. shall present the problem to the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before presenting it to the Intelligence Advisory Committee.] (A-2 prefers the bracketed portion be omitted).

5. As used in this directive, "clandestine collection activities" are understood to be intelligence collection activities or operations, whether by agent, reconnaissance, patrol or observation, which are conducted or sponsored by the U. S. Government, in order to acquire intelligence on foreign states or groups, but which are planned and conducted in such a manner that:

a. Any U. S. Government responsibility for the clandestine activities is not evident to unauthorized persons, or

b. The U. S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them if uncovered, or

c. Although conducted in accordance with paragraphs a. and b. above, a calculated risk is taken that disclosure or compromise would be justified by the results expected.

6. As the agency of primary responsibility in the field of clandestine collection of foreign information outside the United States and its Possessions, the Central Intelligence Agency shall establish the necessary Secretariat for the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee.

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IAC-D-27

17 July 1951

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM IN
THE DETECTION OF LOGISTICAL INDICATIONS OF SOVIET
PREPARATIONS FOR AN ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE

1. Representatives of the IAC collection agencies met on 10 July to discuss the establishment of a coordinated intelligence collection program on the above subject as requested by General Weckerling for the Watch Committee*. It was the consensus that the overt collection agencies were currently taking all measures that they can and the continuing observation necessary could only be achieved through covert means.

2. In order to respond to this request adequately the covert collection offices are faced with the necessity to redeploy their resources, thereby diverting personnel from existing operations which have been established in response to earlier requirements.

3. It is believed that the priority direction for the covert collection offices can be provided by placing the current request in the context of DCID 4/2 ("Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives"), paragraph 2 of which reads:

"Taking direct military action, employing USSR Armed Forces, against vital U. S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Union, and Western Europe."

RECOMMENDATION

1. That insofar as necessary because of limited capabilities the request of General Weckerling should be given priority over other covert requirements which have been levied in support of paragraph 2 of DCID 4/2.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

*Memorandum of 22 June 1951 from General Weckerling to IAC Agencies, same title as this paper.

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IAC-D-26

17 July 1951

RELEASE OF NIS TO SHAPE

1. For consideration of the IAC there is attached a memorandum from General Bolling regarding the release of certain NIS studies to SHAPE.

2. The Army certifies the need for these studies; therefore, the questions posed are:

a. How serious would a compromise of this material be if it took place?

b. Could top secret material be withheld while releasing the rest of the material?

c. Would it be sufficient for U. S. officers to provide guidance where documents are withheld?

JAMES Q. REBER

Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

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17 July 1951

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9 JUL 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Release of NIS to SHAPE

1. Director, Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG) has requested authority to release to the international staff of SHAPE, on a need-to-know basis, all NIS documents on hand with USLO SHAPE pertaining to the USSR and Soviet Satellites.

2. The Department of the Army considers that SACEUR and certain key members of his international staff have a legitimate need for the information in question.

3. In accordance with the National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3, dated 13 January 1948, which states that the Director, Central Intelligence is responsible for the dissemination of National Intelligence Surveys, the Department of the Army recommends your approval of JAMAG's request as indicated in paragraph 1, above.

S/ A. R. BOLLING

A. R. BOLLING
Major General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-2

Copies to:

SD-OIR - Mr. Park Armstrong
AF - Col W. M. Burgess
NAVY - Capt H. C. Daniel
JIG - Col P. A. Putman

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

IAC-D-26

17 July 1951

S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-25

2 July 1951

INTELLIGENCE GAPS AS REVEALED BY NIE-32

1. The attached memorandum from Dr. Langer is distributed to the IAC for information of the heads of the Intelligence Agencies in connection with the consideration of NIE-32.

2. It is requested that each agency immediately take the steps it finds appropriate within its field of responsibility in order to obtain additional information on the subjects listed by Dr. Langer. The Office of Intelligence Coordination in CIA will be in touch with each agency to consult regarding the steps which it is taking and necessary further steps.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-25

2 July 1951

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2 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Intelligence Gaps as Revealed by NIE-32

1. The preparation of NIE-32 was marked at every stage by the paucity of reliable intelligence concerning the military, political, and economic situation of Communist China, and concerning Sino-Soviet relations. There are obviously serious problems of intelligence collection in this area, but the difficulties that were experienced in producing NIE-32 have made all participating agencies increasingly aware that the information required is vital to the security interests of the US and must, if possible, be obtained.

2. The preparation of NIE-32 revealed several critical intelligence gaps which fall within the collection responsibilities of the IAC agencies and which should be pursued on an urgent priority basis:

a. The reported Chinese Communist military training program in Manchuria. It is essential that reliable information be obtained on whether or not the Chinese Communists have units training in Manchuria with modern equipment and, if so, on the extent and nature of such a program.

b. Sino-Soviet political relations. It is suggested that effort be made to secure a more systematic coverage of Chinese material.

c. The scope and nature of Soviet military aid to the Chinese Communists. With the possible exception of military aircraft, there is practically no reliable information available on this subject. Although CIA probably has a major role in the collection effort in this field, other agencies could make a contribution.

d. The quality of Chinese forces engaged in Korea and the qualitative significance of Chinese losses. It is suggested that POW interrogations and/or the analysis of interrogation results give increasing emphasis to this matter.

e. The nature and extent of the Communist logistic build-up in South China. This information is essential to determining Chinese Communist capabilities for aggression against Southeast Asia and Hong Kong.

3. The economic information available to all participating agencies was insufficient to permit a firm estimate on the amount and composition of imports into Communist China during the past year.

2 July 1951

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2 July 1951

4. In addition to those indicated above, there were several major intelligence gaps which became evident in the preparation of NIE-32 and which are within the collection responsibilities of CIA. Steps can be taken within this Agency to obtain on an urgent priority basis additional reliable intelligence on:

a. The degree and nature of popular discontent within Communist China.

b. The size, effectiveness, political control and resistance activities of guerrillas in Communist China.

c. The extent and nature of cleavages in the higher political and military echelons of the Chinese Communist regime.

d. The effectiveness of Western trade restrictions on the Chinese Communist economy.

e. The kinds, amount, and places of origin of strategic goods entering Communist China in contravention of free-world export controls.

f. The training and equipping of elite units of the Chinese Communist Army.

g. The scale and nature of Soviet assistance to Communist China.

WILLIAM L. LANGER
Assistant Director
National Estimates

S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-25

2 July 1951

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-24
19 June 1951

INITIATION OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY ON
"SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS"

In accordance with instructions from the Director of Central Intelligence, the attached memorandum will be placed on the agenda of the next IAC meeting.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-24
19 June 1951

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S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-24

19 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Initiation of a National Intelligence Study on
"Soviet Military Assistance to the Chinese
Communists"

1. In the course of drafting a number of NIE's, the need has become increasingly apparent for a detailed study and rigorous analysis of certain key problems that would provide a firmer basis than now exists for general estimative conclusions. To be of maximum effectiveness, these studies must be more limited in scope and more factual in content than is customary or appropriate for NIE's.

2. As a concrete example, it has become increasingly clear that a sound estimate of the probable Soviet and Chinese Communist courses of action in the Far East cannot be made without a detailed study of available intelligence on the extent and character of Soviet military assistance to the Chinese Communists. A staff study on this subject would have to be prepared on an all-source basis and should present the evidence supporting the generalizations arrived at. Where appropriate, the reliability of the evidence also should be indicated in such a way as to distinguish between areas where we have firm evidence and where we are proceeding on the basis of deduction or supposition.

3. I recommend, therefore, that a National Intelligence Study on "Soviet Military Assistance to the Chinese Communists" be prepared by the IAC Agencies, with ID taking primary responsibility for the work. . . .

WILLIAM L. LANGER
Assistant Director
National Estimates

S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-24

19 June 1951

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4 September 1956

*IAC - D-23/1
14 Aug 56*

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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Cabell

SUBJECT: Report on [REDACTED] Program,
IAC-D-23/1

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1. [REDACTED] Program originated in the IAC, thus it is appropriate that a progress report be rendered.

2. The program has gone about as far as it can without formalization of present operation of the Center through the proposed DCID 15/2.

3. At the Identification Working Group (IWG) of the Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee (JTIS) meeting on 10 July, a modified version of the present report was presented, and the point made that a similar report would be laid before the IAC. Service reaction was strong approval with the thought that anything that would get the program before the heads of the service intelligence organizations was good.

4. Check this morning indicated that only the ONI representative was being sticky. Accusation of "empire building" seemed to be the point of disagreement. This argument is absurd, since we do not propose to increase in any way, except on coordinated requirement, the present operation. All we wish to do is make what we are doing legal. ONI has made least use of the [REDACTED] Center of any of the services.

5. I have graphics for display and briefing purposes if desired.

6. If the IAC approves the recommendation for a DCID 15/2, the DDI would like to have me act as chairman of the working group.

[REDACTED]
Assistant to DD/I (Planning)

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IAC-D-23/1
14 August 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Progress Report on Joint [REDACTED] Program

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January 1951 - January 1956

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Attached is a Progress Report on the Joint [REDACTED]
Program (including Tabs A and B), dated 25 July 1956, by the
Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA. This report will be placed on
the agenda of an early IAC meeting, for noting and appropriate
action with respect to the recommendations made therein.

William P. Bundy
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Secretary

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IAC-D-23
25 May 1951

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The attached paper is circulated for IAC action as recommended in paragraph 4. If oral approval can be obtained prior to the next IAC meeting it will not be necessary to place this paper on the agenda. Prompt notification to my office of the position of each agency with regard to this matter would, therefore, be appreciated.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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